Axiomatic Characterization of Committee Scoring Rules by Skowron, Piotr et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
60
4.
01
52
9v
2 
 [c
s.G
T]
  2
 N
ov
 20
16
Axiomatic Characterization of Committee Scoring Rules
Piotr Skowron
University of Oxford
Oxford, UK
Piotr Faliszewski
AGH University
Krakow, Poland
Arkadii Slinko
University of Auckland
Auckland, New Zealand
October 23, 2018
Abstract
Committee scoring rules form a rich class of aggregators of voters’ preferences for the pur-
pose of selecting subsets of objects with desired properties, e.g., a shortlist of candidates for
an interview, a representative collective body such as a parliament, or a set of locations for a
set of public facilities. In the spirit of celebrated Young’s characterization result that axiom-
atizes single-winner scoring rules, we provide an axiomatic characterization of multiwinner
committee scoring rules. We show that committee scoring rules—despite forming a remarkably
general class of rules—are characterized by the set of four standard axioms, anonymity, neutral-
ity, consistency and continuity, and by one axiom specific to multiwinner rules which we call
committee dominance. In the course of our proof, we develop several new notions and tech-
niques. In particular, we introduce and axiomatically characterize multiwinner decision scoring
rules, a class of rules that broadly generalizes the well-known majority relation.
1 Introduction
One of the most influential results in social choice, Arrow’s impossibility theorem [1], states that
when voters have three or more distinct alternatives (candidates) to choose from, no social welfare
function can map the ranked preferences of individuals into a transitive social preference order while
satisfying four axioms called unrestricted domain, non-dictatorship, Pareto efficiency, and indepen-
dence of irrelevant alternatives. Arrow’s axioms are reasonable at the individual level of cognition
but appeared too strong to require from a social perspective (this seems particularly true for the
independence of irrelevant alternatives axiom). The result was negative but it had two important
consequences. First, knowing what is impossible to achieve is important. Second, Arrow created
a framework for developing a positive approach to the social choice theory, i.e., a framework for
investigations of what is actually possible to achieve. Indeed, numerous axiomatic characterizations
of existing voting rules followed Arrow’s work (these are too numerous to list here, see the survey of
Chebotarev and Shamis [13] for a comprehensive list of such characterizations, as well as Section 2
where we outline work related to ours). This was foreshadowed to a certain extent by May who in
a highly original paper axiomatically characterized the simple majority rule [40] (but in a narrow
framework that did not allow for generalizations).
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Most common voting rules have been introduced without normative considerations. Hence a
discovery of an axiomatic characterization for a voting rule is hard to overestimate. When we ax-
iomatically characterize a rule, we are discovering sets of axioms that we know in advance are
consistent (in particular, the rule that is characterized satisfies all of them). This is, in fact, where
the normative theory begins: a commitment to a particular voting rule is a commitment to the set
of axioms that define this rule. Now, if electoral designers compare two voting rules, they can look
at them from different ‘angles’ where each axiom provides them with a certain ‘view’ of the rule.
These ‘views’ can be interpreted as behavioral characteristics with normative implications. Com-
parisons of such characteristics can cause an electoral designer to prefer one rule to another.
In the process of investigating various voting rules, several axioms were identified that are not
only reasonable at the individual level but also leave enough room for a wide class of procedures
for aggregating preferences of the society. Among them, one of the most important is consistency,1
introduced by Smith [56] and adopted by Young [62]. Consistency says that if two societies decide
on the same set of options and if both societies prefer option x to option y, then the union of these
two societies should also prefer x to y. Amazingly, together with the symmetry (which says that all
alternatives and all voters are treated equally) and continuity,2 consistency uniquely defines the class
of scoring social welfare functions [56, 62], which are also called positionalist voting rules [28, 44]
or, perhaps more commonly, positional scoring rules. These rules are defined as follows. Given
voters’ rankings over alternatives, each alternative earns points from each voter’s ranking depending
on its position in that ranking. The alternative x is then at least as high in the social order as y if
the total number of points that x garnered from all the voters is at least as large as for y. Young also
obtained a similar axiomatic characterization of social choice functions [60], which, unlike social
welfare functions, determine only the winner(s). These characterizations of scoring rules made it
possible to axiomatize some particular scoring rules, most notably Borda [59] and Plurality [49]
(see also the work of Merlin [41] for a refined presentation of Young’s result, and the survey of
Chebotarev and Shamis [13] for a comprehensive list of axiomatic characterizations of voting rules).
The study of single-winner voting rules is now well-advanced [3, 2]. This is not the case for the
multi-winner voting rules, i.e., for the rules that aim at electing committees. The only success in their
axiomatic study was Debord’s characterization of the k-Borda voting rule [16] by methods similar
to Young’s. In this paper we provide axiomatic characterization of committee scoring rules—the
multiwinner analogues of single-winner scoring rules, recently introduced by Elkind et al. [17]—in
the style of Smith’s and Young’s results for the single-winner case [56, 62].
In our model of a multiwinner election, we are given a set of candidates, a collection of voters
with preferences over these candidates, and an integer k. A multiwinner voting rule is an algorithm
that allows us to compare any two committees (i.e., two subsets of candidates of size k) on the basis
of preferences of the voters and, in particular, it allows us to identify the best committee. In other
words, multiwinner voting rules are assumed to produce weak linear orders over the committees.
Multiwinner elections of this type are interesting for a number of reasons, and, in particular, due
to a wide range of their applications. For example, we may use multiwinner elections to choose a
country’s parliament, to identify a list of webpages a search engine should display in response to a
1In Smith’s terminology, separability [56].
2In Smith’s terminology, Archimedean [56]
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query, to choose locations for a set of facilities (e.g., hospitals or fire stations) in a city, to short-list a
group of candidates for a position or a prize, to decide which set of products a company should offer
to its customers (if there is a limited advertising space), or even as part of a genetic algorithm [18].
There are many other applications and we point the reader to the works of Lu and Boutilier [38, 39],
Elkind et al. [17], and Skowron et al. [54] for more detailed discussions of them (including the
applications mentioned above).
Multiwinner voting rules differ from their single-winner counterparts in several important as-
pects. First of all, some multiwinner voting rules take into account possible interdependence be-
tween the committee members—the issue which does not exist when the goal is to select a single
winning candidate. The valuation of a candidate may depend not only on the voters’ preferences
but also on who the other committee members would be. For example, in some cases it is important
to diversify the committee, e.g., when we are choosing locations for a set of facilities like hospi-
tals, when we are choosing a set of advertisements (within the given budget) to reach the broadest
possible audience of customers, or when we want to provide a certain level of proportionality of
representation in a collective body such as a parliament.
Identifying the class of committee scoring rules has been a recent, important step on the way
of getting a better understanding of multiwinner voting rules [17]. Committee scoring rules extend
their single-winner counterparts as follows. Let us recall that a single-winner scoring rule is based on
a scoring function that, given a position of a candidate in a vote (that is, in the ranking of candidates
provided by the voter), outputs the number of points that the candidate gets from this particular
voter. The overall score of a candidate in the election is the sum of the points she gets from all the
votes, and the candidate with the highest overall score wins. In the case of committee scoring rules,
we elect not a single candidate but a committee of size k, so we need a different notion of a position.
Specifically, we say that the position of a committee in a given vote is the set of positions of its
members in this vote. A committee scoring function then assigns points to each possible position of
a committee (with m candidates and committee size k, there are
(
m
k
)
such committee positions) and
the total score of a committee is the sum of the points it gets from all the voters. Then committee X
is at least as good as committee Y if the total number of points that committee X receives is at least
as large as the number of points of committee Y . We view committee scoring rules as social welfare
functions, generalized to the multiwinner setting; in this respect, our approach is closer to that of
Smith [56], Young [62], and Merlin [41] rather than to that of Young [60].
Although this generalization of single-winner voting rules to committee scoring rules is quite
natural, one can expect much more diversity in the multiwinner case. And this is indeed the case:
the committee scoring rules form a remarkably wide class of multiwinner election rules, which
includes simple “best k” rules such as SNTV or k-Borda (which select k candidates that are ranked
first most often, or that have the highest Borda scores, respectively), more involved rules, such as the
Chamberlin–Courant rule [12] that focuses on providing proportional representation, or even more
complex selection procedures, such as the variants of the OWA-based rules of Skowron et al. [54]
and Aziz et al. [6], or decomposable rules of Faliszewski et al. [19] with applications reaching far
beyond political science.
It is, therefore, remarkable that the committee scoring rules admit an axiomatic characterization
very similar in spirit to the celebrated characterization of single-winner scoring rules. Our first main
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result is as follows.
Theorem A (Axiomatic Characterization of Committee Scoring Rules). A multiwinner voting
rule is a committee scoring rule if and only if it is symmetric, consistent, continuous, and satisfies
committee dominance.
Let us give an informal description of the axioms in this characterization and explain the appear-
ance of committee dominance among them. Symmetry, as in the single-winner case, simply means
that all the voters and candidates are treated in a uniform way. This is a standard, widely accepted
requirement, and cannot be disputed if the society adheres to the basic principles of equality both
for the voters and for the candidates.
The requirement of consistency is easily adapted to the multiwinner case. It says that if there
are two groups of voters and for both of them our voting rule shows that committee C1 is at least as
good as committee C2, then the rule must show that C1 is at least as good as C2 when the two groups
join together in a single electorate. We saw that in the case of single-winner rules this requirement is
rather appealing. Rejecting it would be difficult to justify from the point of view of social philosophy
as it would mean that we treat large and small societies differently.
Let us now explain continuity. Again two societies are involved. Suppose that for the first one
the voting rule outputs that committee C1 is at least as good as committee C2 and for the second one
it outputs the opposite conclusion, that committee C2 is strictly better than committee C1. Then, if
we join together the first society and the second society cloned sufficiently many times, then for the
combined society the rule will output that C2 is strictly better than committee C1. That is, continuity
ensures that large enough majority of a population always gets its choice.3
Now, we move to the new axiom which we call committee dominance. This axiom requires
that if there are two committees, X and Y , such that every voter can pair the candidates in X with
candidates in Y into a sequence of pairs (x1, y1), . . . , (xk, yk) so that for every pair (xi, yi) this voter
weakly prefers xi to yi, then the society weakly prefers X to Y . This is an incarnation, in the case
of multiwinner rules, of the famous Pareto Principle which is the least disputable principle in social
choice. Any libertarian philosopher would agree that if such a concept like social preference is at
all used, then it should be derived in some systematic way from individual preferences, and this
inevitably leads to the Pareto Principle. The requirement of committee dominance is, in fact, a part
of the definition of committee scoring rules [17], so it cannot be avoided here. Committee dominance
can also be seen as a weak form of monotonicity (see the works of Elkind et al. [17] and Faliszewski
et al. [19] for extended discussions of various multiwinner monotonicity notions). In his definition
of scoring functions, Young disregards monotonicity considerations and his scoring functions can
assign a higher score to a lower position, but if one were to use the standard definition of a single-
winner scoring rule which is predominantly used in social choice and which stipulates that a higher
position yields a number of points that is at least as high as for any lower position, then one would
have to add to Young’s characterization an axiom enforcing the Pareto Principle too.
Unfortunately, the original Young’s technique cannot be applied to prove Theorem A. Some
observations critical to Young’s approach cannot be extended to multiwinner case. For instance,
3Smith refers to continuity as the Archimedean property and this is a better name for it but, we stick to Young’s
terminology.
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Young’s analysis heavily relies on the fact that for any two ordered pairs of candidates (a1, a2) and
(b1, b2) there is a permutation of the set of candidates that maps a1 to b1 and a2 to b2. This however
fails for two pairs of committees (C1,C2) and (C3,C4) since the intersections C1 ∩ C2 and C3 ∩ C4
may have different cardinalities. As a result, the neutrality axiom (symmetry with respect to the
candidates) has much less bite in the context of multiwinner elections.
Our approach is based on the novel concept of a decision rule (or, a k-decision rule if we fix the
cardinality k of the committees involved). Given a profile of the society and two committees of size
k, a k-decision rule tells us which committee is better for this society (or that they are equally good).
However, as opposed to our multiwinner rules, decision rules are not required to be transitive (e.g.,
it is perfectly legal for a decision rule to say that committee C1 is better than C2, that C2 is better
than C3, and that C3 is better than C1). We note that all the properties of symmetry, consistency and
continuity are equally applicable to decision rules as to multiwinner rules.
In the class of decision rules, we distinguish the class of decision scoring rules that is much
broader than the class of committee scoring rules. A decision scoring rule stipulates that any linear
order in the profile, ‘awards’ points (positive or negative) to pairs of committees. If in a ranking v
committees C1 and C2 have, respectively, committee positions I1 and I2, then this pair of committees
gets d(I1, I2) points from v, where d is a certain function that returns real values. The score of an
ordered pair of committees (C1,C2) is the total number of points that this pair gets from all linear
orders of the profile. If the score is positive, then C1 is strictly preferred over C2. If it is negative,
then C2 is strictly preferred over C1. Otherwise, if the score is zero, the two committees are declared
equally good. Decision scoring rules, while a bit counterintuitive at first, are a very general and
useful notion. For example, one can easily show a decision scoring rule that generates the standard
majority relation, where alternative a is preferred to alternative b if and only if more voters place a
higher than b than the other way around.
As indicated above, decision scoring rules are a very broad class that goes far beyond committee
scoring rules. It is, therefore, quite surprising that we can still obtain an axiomatic characterization
for them (especially that it uses the same axioms as Young’s characterization of single-winner scor-
ing rules [60] adapted to the multiwinner setting):
Theorem B (Axiomatic Characterization of Decision Scoring Rules). A decision rule is a deci-
sion scoring rule if and only if it is symmetric, consistent and continuous.
Since decision rules generalize the notion of the majority relation, this result opens a possibility
to use ideas from the theory of tournament solution concepts in future research on multiwinner rules
(for an overview of tournament theory, see, e.g., the book of Laslier [37]). Our theorem says that de-
cision scoring rules form the unique class of functions mapping voters’ preferences to tournaments
and satisfying the above three axioms.
This paper is organized as follows. First, in Section 2 we discuss related work and then, in
Section 3, we provide necessary background regarding multiwinner elections and committee scoring
rules. In Section 4 we formally describe the axioms that we use in our characterization. Section 5
contains our main result and its proof. The proof is quite involved and is divided into two parts. First,
we provide a variant of our characterization for decision rules (for this part of the proof, we use a
technique that is very different from that used by Young). Second, we build an inductive argument
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with Young’s characterization providing us with the induction base to obtain our final result (while
this part of the proof is inspired by Young’s ideas, it uses new technical approaches and tricks),
using results from the first part as tools. We conclude in Section 6.
2 Related Work
Axiomatic characterizations of single-winner election rules have been actively studied for quite a
long time. Indeed, the classical theorem of Arrow [1] and the related, and equally important, result
of Gibbard [29] and Satterthwaite [51] can be seen as axiomatic characterizations of the dictatorial
rule4 (however, typically these theorems are considered as impossibility results, taking the view of
an electoral designer). Other well-known axiomatic characterizations of single-winner rules include
the characterizations of the majority rule5 due to May [40] and Fishburn [22], several different char-
acterizations of the Borda rule [59, 32, 25, 56] and the Plurality rule [49, 14], the characterization of
the Kemeny rule6 [61], the characterization of the Antiplurality rule [8], and the characterizations of
the approval voting rule7 due to Fishburn [43] and Sertel [52]. Freeman et al. [27] proposed an ax-
iomatic characterization of runoff methods, i.e., methods that proceed in multiple rounds and in each
round eliminate a subset of candidates (the single transferable vote (STV) rule, a rule used, e.g., in
Australia, is perhaps the best known example of such a multistage elimination rule). Still, in terms
of axiomatic properties, single-winner scoring rules appear to be the best understood single-winner
rules. Some of their axiomatic characterizations were proposed by Ga¨rdenfors [28], Smith [56] and
Young [60] (we refer the reader to the survey of Chebotarev and Shamis [13] for an overview of
these characterizations). For a number of voting rules no axiomatic characterizations are yet known.
Probabilistic single-winner election rules have also been a subject of axiomatic studies. For
instance, Gibbard [30] investigated strategyproofness of probabilistic election systems and blue his
result can be seen as an axiomatic characterization of the random dictatorship rule. Brandl et al. [10],
by studying different types of consistency of probabilistic single-winner election rules, characterized
the function returning maximal lotteries, first proposed by Fishburn [26].
The state of research on axiomatic characterizations of multiwinner voting rules is far less ad-
vanced. Indeed, we are aware of only one unconditional characterization of a multiwinner rule:
Debord has characterized the k-Borda rule as the only rule that satisfies neutrality, faithfulness,
consistency, and the cancellation property [16]. Yet, there exists an interesting line of research,
where the properties of multiwinner election rules are studied. A large bulk of this literature fo-
cuses on the principle of Condorcet consistency [7, 33, 24, 48], and on approval-based multiwinner
rules [35, 36, 6, 5]. Properties of other types of multiwinner election rules have been studied by
Felsenthal and Maoz [21], Elkind et al. [17], and—in a somewhat different context—Skowron [53].
4Under the dictatorial voting rule, the winner is the candidate most preferred by a certain fixed voter (the dictator).
5The majority rule is defined for the set of two candidates only. It selects the one out of two candidates that is preferred
by the majority of the voters.
6The Kemeny rule, given the set of rankings over the alternatives, returns a ranking that minimizes the sum of the
Kendall tau [34] distances to the rankings provided by the voters.
7In the approval rule, each voter expresses his or her preferences by providing a set of approved candidates. A candi-
date that was approved by most voters is announced as the winner.
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In their effort to analyze axiomatic properties of multiwinner rules, Elkind et al. [17] introduced
the notion of committee scoring rules, the main focus of the current work. Committee scoring rules
were later studied axiomatically and algorithmically by Faliszewski et al. [19, 20]. In particular,
they have identified many interesting subclasses of committee scoring rules and found that most
committee scoring rules are NP-hard to compute, but in many cases there are good approximation
algorithms (the work on the complexity of committee scoring rules can be traced to the studies of
the complexity of the Chamberlin–Courant rule, initiated by Procaccia, Rosenschein and Zohar [46]
and continued by Lu and Boutilier [38], Betzler et al. [9], and Skowron et al. [55]). The axiomatic
part of the works of Faliszewski et al. [19, 20], has lead, in particular, to characterizations of several
multiwinner voting rules within the class of committee scoring rules. They showed that SNTV is
the only nontrivial weakly separable representation-focused rule, Bloc is the only nontrivial weakly
separable top-k-counting rule, and the k-approval-based Chamberlin–Courant rule is the only non-
trivial representation-focused and top-k-counting rule.8 (For brevity, we omit exact description of
these properties here and point the readers to the original papers.)
Skowron et al. [54] has studied a family of multiwinner rules that are based on utility values of
the alternatives instead of preference orders, and where these utilities are aggregated using ordered
weighted average operators (OWA operators) of Yager [58]. (The same class, but for approval-based
utilities, first appeared in early works of the Danish polymath Thorvald N. Thiele [57] and was later
studied by Forest Simmons9 and Aziz et al. [6, 5]). It is easy to express these OWA-based rules as
committee scoring rules.
As we mentioned in the introduction, the decision rules—studied in Section 5.1—can be seen as
generalizations of majority relations in the case of single-winner elections. In the world of single-
winner elections, majority relations are often seen as inputs to election procedures (known as tourna-
ment solution concepts). For example, according to the Copeland method [15] the candidate with the
greatest number of victories in pairwise comparisons with other candidates is a winner. The Smith
set [56] is another example of such a rule: it returns the minimal (in terms of inclusion) subset of
candidates, such that each member of the set is preferred by the majority of voters over each can-
didate outside the set. Fishburn [23] describes nine other tournament solution concepts that explore
the Condorcet principle for majority graphs. For an overview of tournament solution concepts we
refer the reader to the book of Laslier [37] (and to the chapter of Brandt, Brill, and Harrenstein [11]
for a more computational perspective). We believe that it would be a fascinating topic of research
to explore the properties (computational or axiomatic) of the generalized tournament solutions for
multiwinner rules generated by our decision rules.
Intransitive preference relations have also been studied by Rubinstein [50] and by Nitzan and
Rubinstein [42]. Rubinstein [50] shows axiomatic characterization of scoring systems among rules
which take input preferences in the form of tournaments, i.e., complete, assymetric (possibly intran-
sitive) relations. Nitzan and Rubinstein [42], on the other hand, provide axiomatic characterization
8These characterizations are, in a sense, syntactic, because the properties they rely on describe syntactic features
of committee scoring functions. Faliszewski et al. [19, 20] also provide some semantic characterizations. For example,
within the class of committee scoring rules, a rule is weakly separable if and only if it is non-crossing monotone and,
if a rule is fixed-majority consistent, then it is top-k-counting. In effect, they characterize the Bloc rule as a committee
scoring rule that is non-crossing monotone and fixed-majority consistent.
9See the description in the overview of Kilgour [35].
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of the Borda rule, assuming each voter can have intransitive preferences.
3 Multiwinner Voting and Decision Rules
In this section we provide necessary background regarding multiwinner elections and committee
scoring rules, as well as a definition of our novel concept of decision rules. For each positive integer
t, by [t] we mean the set {1, . . . , t}, and by [t]k we mean the set of all k-element subsets of [t]. For
each set X and each k ∈ N, by S k(X) we denote the set of all k-element subsets of X (so, in particular,
we have that S k([t]) = [t]k). For a given set X, by Π>(X) and Π≥(X) we denote the set of all linear
orders over X and the set of all weak orders over X, respectively.
3.1 Multiwinner Elections
Let A = {a1, . . . , am} be the set of all the candidates, and let N = {1, 2, . . .} be the set of all possible
voters. We refer to the members of S k(A) as size-k committees, or, simply, as committees, when
k is clear from the context. For each finite subset V ⊆ N, by P(V) we denote the set of all |V |-
element tuples of elements from Π>(A), indexed by elements of V . We refer to elements of P(V) as
preference profiles for the set of voters V . We set P = {P ∈ P(V) : V is a finite subset of N} to be
the set of all possible preference profiles. For each preference profile P ∈ P, by Vot(P) we denote
the set of all the voters in P (in particular, we have that for each P ∈ P(V) it holds that Vot(P) = V).
For each profile P and each voter v ∈ Vot(P), by P(v) we denote the preference order of v in P.
Our proof approach crucially relies on using what we call k-decision rules. A k-decision rule fk,
fk : P →
(
S k(A) × S k(A) → {−1, 0, 1}
)
,
is a function that for each preference profile P ∈ P provides a mapping, fk(P) : S k(A) × S k(A) →
{−1, 0, 1}, such that for each two size-k committees C1 and C2 it holds that fk(P)(C1,C2) =
− fk(P)(C2,C1). We interpret fk(P)(C1,C2) = 1 as saying that at profile P the society prefers com-
mittee C1 over committee C2 and we denote this as C1 ≻P C2 (we omit fk from this notation
because it will always be clear from the context). Similarly, we interpret fk(P)(C1,C2) = 0 as say-
ing that at profile P the society views the committees as equally good (denoted C1 =P C2) and
fk(P)(C1,C2) = −1 as saying that at profile P the society prefers C2 to C1 (denoted C2 ≻P C1). We
write C1 P C2 if C1 ≻P C2 or C1 =P C2, which is equivalent to fk(P)(C1,C2) ≥ 0. Sometimes,
when P is a more involved expression, we write C1 [P] C2 instead of C1 P C2 and C1 =[P] C2
instead of C1 =P C2. By C1 ≺P C2 we mean C2 ≻P C1, and by C1 P C2 we mean C2 P C1.
A k-winner election rule fk is a k-decision rule that additionally satisfies the transitivity require-
ment, i.e., it is a k-decision rule such that for each profile P and each three committees C1, C2, and
C3 of size k it satisfies the following condition:
C1 P C2 and C2 P C3 =⇒ C1 P C3.
A multiwinner election rule f is a family ( fk)k∈N of k-winner election rules, with one k-winner rule
for each committee size k. We remark that often multiwinner rules are defined to simply return the
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set of winning committees, whereas in our case they implicitly define weak orders over all possible
committees of a given size. Since the number of such committees is huge, we believe that giving a
concise algorithm for comparing committees—this is what a transitive decision rule is—is the right
way to define a multiwinner analog of a social welfare function.
3.2 Committee Scoring Rules and Decision Scoring Rules
Committee Scoring Rules For a preference order π ∈ Π>(A), by posπ(a) we denote the position
of candidate a in π (the top-ranked candidate has position 1 and the bottom-ranked candidate has
position m). A single-winner scoring function γ : [m] → R assigns a number of points to each
position in a preference order so that γ(i) ≥ γ(i + 1) for all i ∈ [m − 1]. For example, the Borda
scoring function, β : [m] → N, is defined as β(i) = m − i. Similarly, for each t ∈ [m], we define
the t-Approval scoring function, αt, so that αt(i) = 1 for i ≤ t and αt(i) = 0 otherwise. 1-Approval
scoring function is known as the plurality scoring function.
We extend the notion of a position of a candidate to the case of committees in the following
way. For a preference order π ∈ Π>(A) and a committee C ∈ S k(A), by posπ(C) we mean the set
posπ(C) = {posπ(a) : a ∈ C}. By a committee scoring function for committees of size k, we mean
a function λ : [m]k → R, that for each element of [m]k, interpreted as a position of a committee in
some vote, assigns a score. A committee scoring function must also satisfy the following dominance
requirement. Let I and J be two sets from [m]k (i.e., two possible committee positions) such that
I = {i1, . . . , ik}, J = { j1, . . . , jk} with i1 < · · · < ik and j1 < · · · < jk. We say that I dominates J if for
each t ∈ [k] we have it ≤ jt (note that this notion might be referred to as “weak dominance” as well,
since a set dominates itself). If I dominates J, then we require that λ(I) ≥ λ(J). For each set of voters
V ⊆ N and each preference profile P ∈ P(V), by scoreλ(C, P) we denote the total score that the
voters from V assign to committee C. Formally, we have that scoreλ(C, P) = ∑v∈Vot(P) λ(posP(v)(C)).
By a committee scoring function we mean a family of committee scoring functions, one for each
possible size of the committee.
Definition 1 (Committee scoring rules). A multiwinner election rule is a committee scoring rule if
there exists a committee scoring function λ such that for each two equal-size committees C1 and C2,
we have that C1 ≻P C2 if and only if scoreλ(C1, P) > scoreλ(C2, P), and C1 =P C2 if and only if
scoreλ(C1, P) = scoreλ(C2, P).
Committee scoring rules were introduced by Elkind et al. [17] and were later studied by Fal-
iszewski et al. [20, 19] (closely related notions were considered by Thiele [57], Skowron et al. [54]
and by Aziz et al. [5, 6]). Below we present some examples of committee scoring rules by specifying
the actions of the corresponding committee scoring functions on I = {i1, . . . , ik} with i1 < · · · < ik:
1. The single non-transferable vote (SNTV) rule uses scoring function λSNTV(I) = ∑kt=1 α1(it). In
other words, for a given voter it assigns score 1 to every committee that contains her highest-
ranked candidate, and it assigns score zero otherwise. That is, SNTV selects the committee
of k candidates with the highest plurality scores.
2. The Bloc rule uses function λBloc(I) = ∑kt=1 αk(it), i.e., the score a committee gets from a
single vote is the number of committee members positioned among the top k candidates in
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this vote. Bloc selects the committee with the highest total score accumulated from all the
voters (and one can see that it selects k candidates with the highest k-Approval scores).
3. The k-Borda rule uses function λk-Borda(I) = ∑kt=1 β(it), i.e., the score a committee gets from a
single vote is the sum of the Borda scores of the committee members. It selects the committee
with the highest total score (and one can see that this committee consists of k candidates with
the highest Borda scores).
4. The classical Chamberlin–Courant rule [12] is defined through the scoring function λβ-CC(I) =
β(i1) (recall that we assumed that i1 < · · · < ik). Intuitively, under the Chamberlin–Courant
rule the highest-ranked member of a committee is treated as the representative for the given
voter, and this voter assigns the score to the committee equal to the Borda score of his or her
representative.
5. The t-Approval-Based Proportional Approval Voting rule [57, 35, 5, 6, 54] (the αt-PAV rule,
for short) is defined by the scoring function λαt-PAV(I) =
∑k
j=1
1
jαt(i j). Thus, the score that a
voter v assigns to a committee C increases (almost) logarithmically with the number of mem-
bers of S located among the top t preferred candidates by v. The use of logarithmic function,
implemented by the sequence of harmonic weights (1, 1/2, 1/3, . . .) ensures some interesting
properties pertaining to proportional representation of the voters [5], and allows one to view
αt-PAV as an extension of the d’Hondt method of apportionment [47] to the setting where
voters can vote for individual candidates rather than for parties [45].
Naturally, many other rules can be interpreted as committee scoring rules; Faliszewski et al. [20, 19]
provide specific examples.
Decision Scoring Rules Decision scoring rules are our main example of k-decision rules. These
rules are similar to committee scoring rules, but with the difference that the scores of two committees
cannot be computed independently. Specifically, for each pair of committee positions (I1, I2) we
define a numerical value, the score that a voter assigns to the pair of committees (C1,C2) under the
condition that C1 and C2 stand in this voter’s preference order on positions I1 and I2, respectively.
If the total score of a pair of committees (C1,C2) is positive, then C1 is preferred over C2; if it is
negative, then C2 is preferred over C1; if it is equal to zero, then C1 and C2 are seen by this decision
rule as equally good.
Definition 2 (Decision scoring rules). Let d : [m]k × [m]k → R be a decision scoring function, that
is, a function that for each pair of committee positions (I1, I2), where I1, I2 ∈ [m]k, returns a score
value (possibly negative), such that for each I1 and I2, it holds that d(I1, I2) = −d(I2, I1). For each
preference profile P ∈ P and for each pair of committees (C1,C2), we define the score:
scored(C1,C2, P) =
∑
v∈Vot(P)
d(posP(v)(C1), posP(v)(C2)). (1)
A k-decision rule is a decision scoring rule if there exists a decision scoring function d such that for
each preference profile P and each two committees C1 and C2 it holds that: (i) C1 P C2 if and only
if scored(C1,C2, P) ≥ 0, and (ii) C1 =P C2 if and only if scored(C1,C2, P) = 0.
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As we have indicated throughout the introduction and the related work discussion, one of the
arguments in favor of decision scoring rules is that they generalize the notion of a majority relation:
For committee size k = 1 we define dmaj({i1}, {i2}) = 1 if i1 < i2 and dmaj({i1}, {i2}) = −1 if i1 > i2.
A candidate x is preferred to candidate y if and only if more voters place x ahead of y than the other
way around. Naturally, each committee scoring rule is an example of (a transitive) decision scoring
rules as well.
4 Axioms for Our Characterization
In this section we describe the axioms that we use in our characterization of committee scoring
rules. The properties expressed by these axioms are natural, straightforward generalizations of the
respective properties from the world of single-winner elections. We formulate them for the case of
k-decision rules (for a given value of k), but since k-winner rules are a type of k-decision rules, the
properties apply to k-winner rules as well. For each of our properties P, we say that a multiwinner
election rule f = { fk}k∈N satisfies P if fk satisfies P for each k ∈ N.
We start by recalling the definitions of anonymity and neutrality, these two properties ensure
that the election is fair to all voters and all candidates. Anonymity means that none of the voters is
neither privileged nor discriminated against, whereas neutrality says the same for the candidates.
Definition 3 (Anonymity). We say that a k-decision rule fk is anonymous if for each two (not
necessarily different) sets of voters V,V ′ ⊆ N such that |V | = |V ′|, for each bijection ρ : V → V ′
and for each two preference profiles P1 ∈ P(V) and P2 ∈ P(V ′) such that P1(v) = P2(ρ(v)) for each
v ∈ V, it holds that fk(P1) = fk(P2).
Let σ be a permutation of the set of candidates A. For a committee C, by σ(C) we mean the
committee {σ(c) : c ∈ C}. For a linear order π ∈ Π>(A), by σ(π) we denote the linear order such that
for each two candidates a and b we have a π b ⇐⇒ σ(a) σ(π) σ(b). For a given k-decision rule
fk and profile P, by σ( fk(P)) we mean the function such that for each two size-k committees C1 and
C2 it holds that σ( fk(P))(σ(C1), σ(C2) = fk(P)(C1,C2).
Definition 4 (Neutrality). A k-decision rule fk is neutral if for each permutation σ of A and each
two preference profiles P1, P2 over the same set of voters V, such that P1(v) = σ(P2(v)) for each
v ∈ V, it holds that fk(P1) = σ( fk(P2)).
A rule that is anonymous and neutral is called symmetric. We note that our definition of
anonymity resembles the ones used by Young [60] or Merlin [41] rather than the traditional ones,
as presented by May [40] or Arrow [1]. The difference comes from the fact that we (just like Young
and Merlin) need to consider elections with variable sets of voters. The next axiom, in particular,
describes a situation where two elections with disjoint sets of voters are merged. Given two profiles
P and P′ over the same set of alternatives and with disjoint sets of voters, by P + P′ we denote the
profile that consists of all the voters from P and P′ with their respective preferences.
Definition 5 (Consistency). A k-decision rule fk is consistent if for each two profiles P and P′ over
disjoint sets of voters, V ⊂ N and V ′ ⊂ N, and each two committees C1,C2 ∈ S k(A), (i) if C1 ≻P C2
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and C1 P′ C2, then it holds that C1 ≻P+P′ C2, and (ii) if C1 P C2 and C1 P′ C2, then it holds
that C1 P+P′ C2.
In some sense, consistency is the most essential element of Young’s characterization, that distin-
guishes single-winner scoring rules from the other single-winner rules. In particular, it means that
the rule treats small electorates in the same way as it treats large ones.
In the framework of social welfare functions (and our decision rules are analogues of those) it is
important to distinguish consistency and reinforcement axioms. If we were to express the reinforce-
ment axiom in our language, it would be worded in the same way as the consistency axiom, except
that the conclusion would only apply to profiles P and P′ such that fk(P) = fk(P′) (i.e., when the
entire rankings produced by the rule for profiles P and P′ coincide). On the other hand, the premise
of consistency requires only that fk(P) and fk(P′) agree on the ranking of C and C′ which is a much
weaker requirement than fk(P) = fk(P′). As a result, the consistency axiom is much stronger than
the reinforcement axiom. For example, Kemeny’s social welfare function satisfies reinforcement
but not consistency. (We point the reader to the work of Young and Levenglick for an axiomatic
characterization of the Kemeny’s rule [61] using the reinforcement axiom.)
Remark 1. In our proofs, we often use the consistency axiom in the following way. Let C1 and C2
be two committees and let P and Q be two profiles over disjoint voter sets, such that C1 ≻P+Q C2
and C1 =P C2. Using consistency, we conclude that C1 ≻Q C2. Indeed, if, for example, it were the
case that C2 Q C1 then by consistency (as applied to merging profiles P and Q) we would have to
conclude that C2 P+Q C1 which is the opposite to what is assumed.
The next axiom concerns the dominance relation between committee positions and specifies a
basic monotonicity condition (it can also be viewed as a form of Pareto dominance).
Definition 6 (Committee Dominance). A k-decision rule fk has the committee dominance property
if for every profile P and every two committees C1,C2 ∈ S k(A) the following holds: If for every vote
v ∈ Vot(P) we have that posP(v)(C1) dominates posP(v)(C2), then C1 P C2.
The definition of committee scoring rules requires that if λ is a committee scoring function (for
committee size k) and I and J are two committee positions such that I dominates J, then λ(I) ≥ λ(J).
That is, committee scoring rules have the committee dominance property by definition and, thus, we
include this axiom in our characterization. Young [60] did not include axioms of this form because
he allowed scoring functions to assign lower scores to higher positions.
Finally, we define the continuity property, which ensures that if a certain set of voters V prefers
C1 over C2, then for each set of voters V ′, disjoint from V , there exists some (possibly large) number
n, such that if we clone V exactly n times and add such a profile to V ′, then in this final profile C1 will
be preferred to C2 (note that when we speak of cloning voters, we implicitly assume that the decision
rule is anonymous and that the identities of the cloned voters do not matter). Thus, continuity might
be viewed as a kind of “large enough majority always gets its choice” principle.
Definition 7 (Continuity). An anonymous k-decision rule fk is continuous if for each two committees
C1,C2 ∈ S k(A) and each two profiles P1 and P2 where C1 ≻P2 C2, there exists a number n ∈ N such
that for the profile Q = P1 + nP2 (that consists of the profile P1 and of n copies of the profile P2), it
holds that C1 ≻Q C2.
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Although we call this axiom continuity (after Young), we note that there are many axioms
of this nature in decision theory, where they are called “Archimedean.” Such axioms usually rule
out the existence of parameters which are infinitely more important than some other parameters;
mathematically, this is usually expressed in terms of rules that use lexicographic orders (see, for
example, axiom A3 in the work of Gilboa, Schmeidler, and Wakker [31] on Case-Based Decision
Theory). In Young’s characterization the continuity axiom plays a similar role. For more discussion
on continuity, we refer the reader to the original work of Young [60].
5 Proofs of Main Results
We now start proving our main results—the axiomatic characterizations of committee scoring rules
and of decision scoring rules, i.e., Theorems A and B. In fact, Theorem B will be proved first and
will serve as an intermediate step in proving Theorem A. Here is the roadmap of the proof.
Since anonymity allows us to ignore the order of linear orders in profiles, in Section 5.1 we
change the domain of our rules from the set of preference profiles to the set of voting situations.
A voting situation is an m!-dimensional vector with non-negative integers specifying how many
times each linear order representing a vote repeats in the voters’ preferences. We use this new
representation of the domain of decision rules in Section 5.1 and we conclude this section by proving
Theorem B.
In Section 5.2 we further extend the domain of our rules to generalized voting situations, al-
lowing fractional and negative multiplicities of linear orders; the voting situations in such extended
domain can then be identified with the elements of Qm!. We use characterization from Section 5.1 to
prove that for each symmetric, consistent, committee-dominant, continuous k-winner election rule
fk and each two committees of size k the set of voting situations for which C1 and C2 are equivalent
is a hyperplane inQm!. This will be an important technical tool in the subsequent proof. In particular,
this observation will be used in Lemma 7 which implies that for the proof of Theorem A it would
be sufficient to find a committee scoring rule that correctly identifies the voting situations for which
given committees are equivalent under fk.
In Sections 5.3 and 5.4 we then concentrate solely on proving Theorem A. In Section 5.3, we
prove Theorem A for the case where f is used to recognize in which profiles a certain committee
C1 is preferred over some other committee C2, when |C1 ∩ C2| = k − 1. If |C1 ∩ C2| = k − 1 then
there are only two candidates, let us refer to them as c1 and c2, such that C1 = (C1 ∩ C2) ∪ {c1},
and C2 = (C1 ∩ C2) ∪ {c2}. Thus, this case closely resembles the single-winner setting, studied by
Young [60] and Merlin [41]. For each two candidates c1 and c2, Young and Merlin present a basis
of the vector space of preference profiles that satisfies the following two properties:
(i) For each preference profile in the basis, the scores of c1 and c2 are equal according to every
possible scoring function.
(ii) Candidates c1 and c2 are “symmetric” and, thus, every neutral and anonymous voting rule has
to judge them as equally good.
These observations allow one to use geometric arguments to note that the set of profiles in which c1
is preferred over c2 can be separated from the set of profiles in which c2 is preferred over c1 by a hy-
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perplane. The coefficients of the linear equation that specifies this hyperplane define a single-winner
scoring rule, and this scoring rule is exactly the voting rule that one started with. In Section 5.3 we
use the same geometric arguments, but the construction of the appropriate basis is more sophisti-
cated. Indeed, finding this basis is the core technical part of Section 5.3.
In Section 5.4 we extend the result from Section 5.3 to the case of any two committees (irrespec-
tive of the size of their intersection), concluding the proof. Here, finding an appropriate basis seems
even harder and, consequently, we use a different technique. To deal with committees C1 and C2
that have fewer than k−1 elements in common, we form a third committee, C3, whose intersections
with C1 and C2 have more elements than the intersection of C1 and C2. Then, using an inductive
argument, we conclude that the space of profiles P where C1 =P C3 is (m! − 1)-dimensional, and
that the same holds for the space of profiles P such that C2 =P C3. An intersection of two vector
spaces with this dimension has dimension at least m! − 2 and, so, we have a subspace of profiles P
such that C1 =P C2 whose dimension is at least (m − 2)!. Using combinatorial arguments, we find
a profile P′ which does not belong to the space but for which C1 =P′ C2 still holds. This gives us
our (m − 1)!-dimensional space. By applying results from the first part of the proof, this suffices to
conclude that the committee scoring function that we found in Section 5.3 for committees that differ
in at most one element works for all other committees as well.
5.1 Characterization of Decision Rules
We start our analysis by considering k-decision rules. Recall that the outcomes of k-decision rules
do not need to be transitive. That is, for a k-decision rule fk it is possible to have a profile P and
three committees such that C1 ≻P C2, C2 ≻P C3, and C3 ≻P C1. The remaining part of this section
is devoted to proving Theorem B.
The whole discussion, i.e., this and the following sections, is divided into small subsections,
each with a title describing its main outcome. These section titles are intended to help the reader
navigate through the proof, but otherwise one can read the text as a continuous piece. In particular,
all the notations, conventions, and definitions carry over from one subsection to the next, and so on.
Setting up the Framework. Let us fix, for the rest of the proof, a positive integer k, the size of the
committee to be elected, and a symmetric, consistent, continuous k-decision rule fk. Our immediate
goal is to show that this rule must be a decision scoring rule. For this, we need to find a function
d : [m]k × [m]k → R such that for each profile P and each two committees C1, C2 it holds that
C1 P C2 if and only if scored(C1,C2, P) ≥ 0.
Our function d will be piecewise-defined. For each s ∈ [k] we will define a function ds which
applies only to pairs (I1, I2) ∈ [m]k × [m]k satisfying |I1 ∩ I2| = s, outputs real values and such that
the score:
scoreds(C1,C2, P) =
∑
v∈Vot(P)
ds(posP(v)(C1), posP(v)(C2)) (2)
calculated with the use of this function satisfies the following condition: if |C1 ∩ C2| = s, then
C1 P C2 if and only if scoreds (C1,C2, P) ≥ 0. Pursuing this idea, for the rest of the proof we will
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fix s and restrict ourselves to pairs of committees satisfying |C1 ∩ C2| = s. The restriction of fk to
such pairs of committees will be denoted fk,s.
The First Domain Change. Anonymity of fk allows us to use a more convenient domain for
representing preference profiles. Indeed, under anonymity the order of votes in any profile is no
longer meaningful and the outcome of any symmetric rule is fully determined by the voting situation
that specifies how many times each linear order repeats in a given profile. In particular, for any
π ∈ Π>(A) and voting situation P, by P(π) we mean the number of voters in P with preference order
π. Fixing some order on possible votes from Π>(A), a voting situation can, thus, be viewed as an
m!-dimensional vector with non-negative integer coefficients.
Correspondingly, we can view fk as a function:
fk : Nm! → (S k(A) × S k(A) → {−1, 0, 1}),
with the domain Nm! instead of P (recall the definition of a k-decision rule in Section 3.1). Repre-
senting profiles by voting situations will be helpful in our further analysis, since algebraic operations
on vectors from Nm! become meaningful: for a voting situation P and a constant c ∈ N, cP is the
voting situation that corresponds to P in which each vote was replicated c times. Similarly, for two
voting situations P and Q, the sum P + Q is the voting situation obtained by merging P and Q.
Subtraction of voting situations can sometimes be meaningful as well.
Given a voting situation P, when we speak of “some vote v in P,” we mean “some preference
order that occurs within P.” We sometimes treat each vote v (i.e., each preference order) as a stan-
dalone voting situation that contains this vote only. When we say that we modify some vote within
some voting situation P, we mean modifying only one copy of this vote, and not all the votes that
have the same preference order.
Let d′ : [m]k×[m]k → R be some decision scoring function. Naturally, we can speak of applying
the corresponding decision scoring rule to voting situations instead of applying them to preference
profiles as in (1). For a voting situation P ∈ P, the score of a committee pair (C1,C2) is:
scored′(C1,C2, P) =
∑
v∈Π>(A)
P(v) · d′(posv(C1), posv(C2)). (3)
Independence of Committee Comparisons from Irrelevant Swaps. We will now show that for
each two committees C1 and C2, the result of their comparison according to fk depends only on
the positions on which C1 and C2 are ranked by the voters (and do not depend on the positions of
candidates not belonging to C1∪C2). In particular, if a committee C1 is better than committee C2 in
some election, then it will also be better after we permute the set of candidates in some of the votes
but without changing the positions of committees C1 and C2 in these votes.
For v ∈ Π>(A), we write v[a ↔ b] to denote the vote obtained from v by swapping candidates
a and b. Further, if v is a vote in P, by P[v, a ↔ b] we denote the voting situation obtained from
P by swapping a and b in v, and by P[a ↔ b] we denote the voting situation obtained from P by
swapping a and b in every vote.
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Lemma 1. Let C1 and C2 be two size-k committees, P be a voting situation, a, b be two candidates
such that one of the following conditions is satisfied: (i) a, b < C1 ∪ C2, (ii) a, b ∈ C1 ∩ C2,
(iii) a, b ∈ C1 \ C2, or (iv) a, b ∈ C2 \ C1. Then for each vote v in P, C1 P C2 if and only if
C1 P[v,a↔b] C2.
Proof. Let us assume that C1 P C2. Our goal is to show that C1 P[v,a↔b] C2, so for the sake of
contradiction we assume that C2 ≻P[v,a↔b] C1 holds.
We rename the candidates so that C1 \ C2 = {a1, . . . , aℓ} and C2 \ C1 = {b1, . . . , bℓ}, and we
define σ to be a permutation (over the set of candidates) that for each x ∈ [ℓ] swaps ax with bx, but
leaves all the other candidates intact. That is, σ(ai) = bi and σ(bi) = ai for all i ∈ [ℓ], and for each
candidate c < {a1, . . . , aℓ, b1, . . . , bℓ} it holds that σ(c) = c. Since C1 P C2, by neutrality we have
that C2 σ(P) C1. Due to our assumptions, it holds that C2 ≻P[v,a↔b] C1 and, by consistency,
C2 ≻
[
σ(P) + P[v, a ↔ b]] C1. (4)
Let Q = v[a ↔ b]+σ(v) be a voting situation that consists just of two votes, v[a ↔ b] and σ(v).
We observe that σ(P) − σ(v) = σ(P[v, a ↔ b] − v[a ↔ b]). This is because P[v, a ↔ b] − v[a ↔ b]
is the same as P − v. Since:
σ(P) + P[v, a ↔ b] − Q = (σ(P) − σ(v))︸           ︷︷           ︸
R′
+ (P[v, a ↔ b] − v[a ↔ b])︸                          ︷︷                          ︸
R′′
,
and both summands on the right-hand-side are symmetric with respect to σ (i.e., σ(R′) = R′′,
σ(R′′) = R′, and σ2 is an identity permutation), by symmetry of fk we have:
C2 =[σ(P) + P[v, a ↔ b] − Q] C1. (5)
Thus, by consistency—as applied to equations (4) and (5) in the way described in Remark 1—we
get that C2 ≻Q C1. By neutrality, we also infer that C2 ≻Q[a↔b] C1. This follows because for each of
the four conditions for a, b from the statement of the lemma it holds that permutation a ↔ b maps
committee C1 to committee C1 and committee C2 to committee C2. Next, by consistency we get
that C2 ≻[Q+Q[a↔b]] C1. However, we observe that:
Q + Q[a ↔ b] =
(
v[a ↔ b] + σ(v)
)
+
(
v + σ(v)[a ↔ b]
)
=
(
v[a ↔ b] + σ(v)[a ↔ b]
)
︸                            ︷︷                            ︸
Q′
+
(
v + σ(v)
)
︸      ︷︷      ︸
Q′′
.
Furthermore, if a, b < C1 ∪ C2, or a, b ∈ C1 ∩ C2, then σ(v)[a ↔ b] = σ(v[a ↔ b]). On the other
hand, if a, b ∈ C1 \ C2 or a, b ∈ C2 \ C1, then σ(v)[a ↔ b] = (σ ◦ [a ↔ b])(v[a ↔ b]). In other
words, there always exists a permutation τ such that Q′ = τ(Q′), C1 = τ(C2), and C2 = τ(C1) (τ is
either σ or σ ◦ [a ↔ b]), and, similarly, we have Q′′ = σ(Q′′), C2 = σ(C1), C1 = σ(C2). Thus, by
neutrality, we get that:
C2 =
[
v[a ↔ b] + σ(v[a ↔ b])] C1 and C2 =[v + σ(v)] C1.
Thus, by consistency, we infer that C2 =[Q+Q[a↔b]] C1, which contradicts our previous conclusion.
This completes the proof. 
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Putting the Focus on Two Fixed Committees. Recall that we have assumed fk to be symmetric,
consistent and continuous. Now, we fix a pair of size-k committees, C1 and C2 with |C1 ∩ C2| = s,
and define fC1,C2 to be the rule that acts on voting situations in the same way as fk,s does, but with
the difference that it only distinguishes, at any voting situation P, whether (i) C1 is preferred over
C2, or (ii) C1 and C2 are seen as equally good, or (iii) C2 is preferred over C1. In other words, we
set fC1,C2(P) to be −1, 0 or 1 depending on fk,s(P) ranking C1 lower than, equally to, or higher than
C2, respectively ( fk,s can be viewed as the collection of rules fC′1,C′2 , one for each possible pair of
committees C′1 and C
′
2).
Defining Distinguished Profiles. For each two committee positions I1 and I2 such that |I1 ∩ I2| =
|C1 ∩C2| = s, we consider a single-vote voting situation v(C1 → I1,C2 → I2), where C1 and C2 are
ranked on positions I1 and I2, respectively, and all the other candidates are ranked arbitrarily, but in
some fixed, predetermined order.
Let us consider two cases. First, let us assume that for each two committee positions I1 and
I2 such that |I1 ∩ I2| = s, it holds that C1 is as good as C2 relative to v(C1 → I1,C2 → I2), i.e.,
C1 =
[
v(C1 → I1,C2 → I2)] C2. By Lemma 1, we infer that for each single-vote voting situation
v we have C1 =v C2 (because in any vote the set of positions shared by C1 and C2 always has the
same cardinality s). Further, by consistency, we conclude that fC1,C2 is trivial, i.e., for every voting
situation P it holds that C1 =P C2. By neutrality, we get that fk,s is also trivial (i.e., it declares
equally good each two committees whose intersection has s candidates). Of course, in this case fk,s
is a decision scoring rule (with trivial scoring function ds(I1, I2) ≡ 0).
If the above case does not hold, then there are some two committee positions, I∗1 and I
∗
2 , such
that |I∗1 ∩ I
∗
2 | = s and C1 is not equivalent to C2 relative to v(C1 → I∗1,C2 → I∗2). Without loss of
generality we assume that:
C1 ≻[v(C1 → I∗1 ,C2 → I∗2)] C2. (6)
We note that, by neutrality, this implies:
C2 ≻[v(C2 → I∗1 ,C1 → I∗2)] C1. (7)
Let us fix any two such I∗1 and I
∗
2 for now. As we will see throughout the proof, any choice of I
∗
1
and I∗2 with the aforementioned property will suffice for our arguments.
For each two committee positions I1 and I2 with |I1 ∩ I2| = |I∗1 ∩ I
∗
2 | = s, and for each two
nonnegative integers x and y, we define the following voting situation:
Py(C1→I
∗
1 ,C2→I
∗
2)
x(C1→I1,C2→I2) = y ·
(
v(C1 → I∗1,C2 → I∗2)
)
+ x ·
(
v(C1 → I1,C2 → I2)),
where there are y voters that rank C1 and C2 on positions I∗1 and I
∗
2, respectively, and there are x
voters that rank C1 and C2 on positions I1 and I2, respectively.
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Deriving the Components for the Decision Scoring Function for fC1,C2 . We now proceed to-
ward defining a decision scoring function for fk,s. To this end, we define the value ∆I1,I2 as:
∆I1,I2 =

sup
{ y
x
: C2 ≻
[
Py(C1→I
∗
1 ,C2→I
∗
2)
x(C1→I2,C2→I1)
]
C1, x, y ∈ N
}
for C1 ≻
[
v(C1 → I1,C2 → I2)] C2,
− inf
{ y
x
: C2 ≻
[
Py(C1→I
∗
2 ,C2→I
∗
1)
x(C1→I2,C2→I1)
]
C1, x, y ∈ N
}
for C2 ≻
[
v(C1 → I1,C2 → I2)] C1,
0 for C1 =
[
v(C1 → I1,C2 → I2)] C2.
(8)
This definition certainly might not seem intuitive at first. However, we will show that the values
∆I1,I2 , for all possible I1 and I2 with |I1 ∩ I2| = s, in essence, define a decision scoring function for
fk,s. The next few lemmas should build an intuition for the nature of these values. However, let us
first argue that the values ∆I1 ,I2 are well defined. Let us fix some committee positions I1 and I2 (such
that |I1∩I2 | = |I∗1∩I
∗
2 | = s). Due to continuity of fk, we see that the appropriate sets in Equation (8) are
non-empty. For example, if C1≻
[
v(C1 → I1,C2 → I2)]C2 and, thus, C2≻[v(C1 → I2,C2 → I1)]C1,
then continuity of fk ensures that there exists (possibly large) x such that C2 ≻
[
P(C1→I
∗
1 ,C2→I
∗
2)
x(C1→I2,C2→I1)
]
C1.
This proves that the set from the first condition of (8) is nonempty. An analogous reasoning proves
the same fact for the set from the second condition in (8). Further, we claim that the value ∆I1,I2
is finite. This is evident for the case where we take the infimum over the set of positive rational
numbers. For the case where we take the supremum, this follows from Lemma 2, below.
Lemma 2. For each two committee positions I1 and I2 with |I1∩I2| = s, it holds that ∆I2 ,I1 = −∆I1,I2 .
Proof. We assume, without loss of generality, that C1 ≻[v(C1 → I1,C2 → I2)] C2.10 Let us consider
two sets:
U =
{ y
x
: C2 ≻
[
Py(C1→I
∗
1 ,C2→I
∗
2)
x(C1→I2,C2→I1)
]
C1, x, y ∈ N
}
(U is the set that we take supremum of in Equation (8)), and:
L =
{y
x
: C2 ≻
[
Py(C1→I
∗
2 ,C2→I
∗
1)
x(C1→I1,C2→I2)
]
C1, x, y ∈ N
}
(thus, L is the set that we take infimum of in Equation (8), for ∆I2,I1). We will show that sup U =
inf L. First, we show that sup U ≤ inf L. For the sake of contradiction, let us assume that this is not
the case, i.e., that there exists y
x
∈ U and y
′
x′
∈ L such that y
x
>
y′
x′
. Since y
x
∈ U and y
′
x′
∈ L, we get:
C2 ≻
[
Py(C1→I
∗
1 ,C2→I
∗
2)
x(C1→I2,C2→I1)
]
C1 and C2 ≻
[
Py
′(C1→I∗2 ,C2→I∗1)
x′(C1→I1,C2→I2)
]
C1.
Let us consider the voting situation:
S = y′ · Py(C1→I
∗
1 ,C2→I
∗
2)
x(C1→I2,C2→I1) + y · P
y′(C1→I∗2 ,C2→I∗1)
x′(C1→I1,C2→I2).
10This assumption is without loss of generality because the condition from the statement of the lemma, ∆I2,I1 = −∆I1,I2 ,
is symmetric; if it held that C2 ≻
[
v(C1 → I1,C2 → I2)] C1 then we could simply swap I2 and I1, and we would prove that
∆I1 ,I2 = −∆I2,I1 .
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By consistency, we have that C2 ≻S C1. However, let us count the number of voters in S that rank
committees C1 and C2 on particular positions. There are yy′ voters that rank C1 and C2 on positions
I∗1 and I
∗
2 , respectively, and the same number yy
′ of voters that rank C1 and C2 on positions I∗2 and I
∗
1.
Due to neutrality and consistency, these voters cancel each other out. (Formally, if S ′ were a voting
situation limited to these voters only, we would have C1 =S ′ C2. This is so due to the symmetry of fk
and the fact that for any permutation σ that swaps all the members of C1 \C2 with all the members
of C2 \ C1, we have S ′ = σ(S ′).) Next, there are x′y voters that rank C1 and C2 on positions I1,
and I2, and xy′ of voters that rank C1 and C2 on positions I2 and I1, respectively. Since we assumed
that y
x
>
y′
x′
, we have that x′y > xy′. So, xy′ voters from each of the two aforementioned groups
cancel each other out (in the same sense as above), and we are left with considering x′y − xy′ > 0
voters that rank C1 and C2 on positions I1 and I2. Thus, we conclude that C1 ≻S C2. However, this
contradicts the fact that C2 ≻S C1 and we conclude that sup U ≤ inf L.
Next, we show that sup U ≥ inf L. To this end, we will show that there are no values y
x
and y
′
x′
such that sup U < y
x
<
y′
x′
< inf L. Assume on the contrary that this is not the case and that such
values exist. It must be the case that y
x
is not in U and, so, we have:
C1 
[
Py(C1→I
∗
1 ,C2→I
∗
2)
x(C1→I2,C2→I1)
]
C2. (9)
Since y
x
also cannot be in L, we have:
C1 
[
Py(C1→I
∗
2 ,C2→I
∗
1)
x(C1→I1,C2→I2)
]
C2. (10)
By neutrality (applied to (10), and any permutation σ that swaps candidates from C1 \ C2 with
those from C2 \ C1), we have that:
C2 
[
Py(C1→I
∗
1 ,C2→I
∗
2)
x(C1→I2,C2→I1)
]
C1. (11)
By putting together Equations (9) and (11), and by noting that the same reasoning can be repeated
for y
′
x′
instead of y
x
, we conclude that it must be the case that:
C1 =
[
Py(C1→I
∗
1 ,C2→I
∗
2)
x(C1→I2,C2→I1)
]
C2 and C1 =
[
Py
′(C1→I∗1 ,C2→I∗2)
x′(C1→I2,C2→I1)
]
C2. (12)
After applying neutrality to the first voting situation in (12) (and copying the second part of (12))
we obtain:
C1 =
[
Py(C1→I
∗
2 ,C2→I
∗
1)
x(C1→I1,C2→I2)
]
C2 and C1 =
[
Py
′(C1→I∗1 ,C2→I∗2)
x′(C1→I2,C2→I1)
]
C2. (13)
We now define voting situation:
Q = x′ · Py(C1→I
∗
2 ,C2→I
∗
1)
x(C1→I1,C2→I2) + x · P
y′(C1→I∗1 ,C2→I∗2)
x′(C1→I2,C2→I1).
From Equation (13) (and consistency), we get that C1 =Q C2. In Q there is the same number of
voters who rank C1 and C2 on positions I1 and I2 as those that rank them on positions I2 and I1,
respectively (so these voters cancel each other out). On the other hand, there are yx′ voters who rank
C1 and C2 on positions I∗2 and I
∗
1 , and y
′x voters who rank these committees on positions I∗1 and I
∗
2,
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respectively. Since yx′ < y′x, we get that C1 ≻Q C2, which contradicts our earlier observation that
C1 =Q C2. We conclude that it must be the case that sup U ≥ inf L.
Finally, since we have shown that sup U ≤ inf L and sup U ≥ inf L, we have that sup U = inf L.
This proves that ∆I2,I1 = −∆I1,I2 . 
The next lemma shows that ∆I1 ,I2 provides a threshold value for proportions of voters in distin-
guished profiles with respect to the relation between C1 and C2.
Lemma 3. Let I1 and I2 be two committee positions such that |I1 ∩ I2| = s, and let x, y be two
positive integers. The following two implications hold:
1. if C1 ≻[v(C1 → I1,C2 → I2)] C2 and y
x
< ∆I1,I2 , then C2 ≻
[
Py(C1→I
∗
1 ,C2→I
∗
2)
x(C1→I2,C2→I1)
]
C1,
2. if C2 ≻[v(C1 → I1,C2 → I2)] C1 and y
x
> −∆I1,I2 , then C2 ≻
[
Py(C1→I
∗
2 ,C2→I
∗
1)
x(C1→I2,C2→I1)
]
C1.
Proof. Let us start with proving the first implication. Assume that C1 ≻[v(C1 → I1,C2 → I2)] C2,
and, for the sake of contradiction, that:
C1 
[
Py(C1→I
∗
1 ,C2→I
∗
2)
x(C1→I2,C2→I1)
]
C2. (14)
It follows from the definition of ∆I1,I2 that there exist two numbers x′, y′ ∈ N, such that
y
x
<
y′
x′
≤
∆I1,I2 and:
C2 ≻
[
Py
′(C1→I∗1 ,C2→I∗2)
x′(C1→I2,C2→I1)
]
C1. (15)
Let us consider a voting situation that is obtained from Py(C1→I
∗
1 ,C2→I
∗
2)
x(C1→I2,C2→I1) (i.e., from the voting situa-
tion that appears in (14)) by swapping positions of C1 and C2, i.e., let us consider voting situation
Py(C1→I
∗
2 ,C2→I
∗
1)
x(C1→I1,C2→I2). Naturally, in such a voting situation C2 is weakly preferred over C1:
C2 
[
Py(C1→I
∗
2 ,C2→I
∗
1)
x(C1→I1,C2→I2)
]
C1. (16)
By Equations (16), (15), and consistency of fk, we observe that in the voting situation:
P = x′ · Py(C1→I
∗
2 ,C2→I
∗
1)
x(C1→I1,C2→I2) + x · P
y′(C1→I∗1 ,C2→I∗2)
x′(C1→I2,C2→I1)
committee C2 is strictly preferred over C1 (i.e., C2 ≻P C1). Let us now count the voters in P. There
are xx′ of them who put C1 and C2 on positions I1 and I2, respectively, and there are xx′ voters
who put C1 and C2 on positions I2 and I1, respectively. By the same arguments as used in the
proof of Lemma 2, these voters cancel each other out. Next, there are y′x voters who put C1 and
C2 on positions I∗1 and I
∗
2 , respectively, and x
′y voters who put C1 and C2 on positions I∗2 and I
∗
1,
respectively. Since y′x > yx′. we conclude that C1 ≻P C2 (again, using the same reasoning as we
used in Lemma 2 for similar arguments). This is a contradiction with our earlier observation that
C2 ≻P C1. This completes the proof of the first part of the lemma.
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The proof of the second implication is similar and we provide it for the sake of completeness.
We assume that C2 ≻
[
v(C1 → I1,C2 → I2)] C1 and, for the sake of contradiction, that:
C1 
[
Py(C1→I
∗
2 ,C2→I
∗
1)
x(C1→I2,C2→I1)
]
C2. (17)
From the definition of ∆I1,I2 we know that there must be two numbers x′, y′ ∈ N, such that
y
x
>
y′
x′
≥
−∆I1,I2 and:
C2 ≻
[
Py
′(C1→I∗2 ,C2→I∗1)
x′(C1→I2,C2→I1)
]
C1. (18)
If we swap the positions of committees C1 and C2 in the voting situation used in Equation (17), then
by neutrality we have that:
C2 
[
Py(C1→I
∗
1 ,C2→I
∗
2)
x(C1→I1,C2→I2)
]
C1 (19)
We now form voting situation:
Q = x′ · Py(C1→I
∗
1 ,C2→I
∗
2)
x(C1→I1,C2→I2) + x · P
y′(C1→I∗2 ,C2→I∗1)
x′(C1→I2,C2→I1)
By Equations (19), (18), and consistency of fk we have that C2 ≻Q C1. However, counting voters
again leads to a contradiction. Indeed, we have xx′ voters who put C1 and C2 on positions I1 and I2,
respectively, and xx′ voters who put C1 and C2 on positions I2 and I1, respectively. These voters can-
cel each other out. Then we have y′x voters who put C1 and C2 on positions I∗2 and I
∗
1 , respectively,
and we have x′y voters who put C1 and C2 on positions I∗1 and I
∗
2 , respectively. Since y
′x < x′y,
we have that C1 ≻Q C2, which is a contradiction with our previous conclusion that C2 ≻Q C1. This
proves the second part of the lemma. 
Putting Together the Decision Scoring Function for fC1,C2 . We are ready to define a decision
scoring function ds for fC1 ,C2 . For any two committee positions I1 and I2, with |I1 ∩ I2| = s, we set:
ds(I1, I2) = ∆I1,I2 .
We note that our ds formally depends on the choice of I∗1 and I
∗
2, however this is not a problem.
We simple need a decision scoring function that behaves correctly and each choice of I∗1 and I
∗
2
would give us one. Intuitively, we can think of ds(I1, I2) as an (oriented) distance between I1 and I2.
The next lemma shows that we treat the distance between I∗1 and I
∗
2 as a sort of gauge to measure
distances between other positions.
Lemma 4. It holds that ∆I∗1 ,I∗2 = 1.
Proof. We note that for each positive integer z, we have C1 =[Pz(C1→I∗1 ,C2→I∗2)z(C1→I∗2 ,C2→I∗1)
] C2. Further, due to
consistency of fk (used as in Remark 1) and by the choice of I∗1 and I∗2 (recall Equations (6) and (7)),
we observe that C1 ≻
[
Py(C1→I
∗
1 ,C2→I
∗
2)
x(C1→I∗2 ,C2→I∗1)
]
C2 whenever y > x and C2 ≻
[
Py(C1→I
∗
1 ,C2→I
∗
2)
x(C1→I∗2 ,C2→I∗1)
]
C1 whenever
y < x. We conclude that ∆I∗1 ,I∗2 = sup
{ y
x
: y < x, for x, y ∈ N+
}
= 1. 
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The next lemma shows that ds is a decision scoring function for fC1,C2 . Based on this result, we
will later argue that it works for all pairs of committees, not only for (C1,C2), and hence that it is a
decision scoring function for fk,s.
Lemma 5. Let C1,C2 and ds be as defined in the above discussion. Then for each voting situa-
tion P the following three implications hold: (i) if scoreds(C1,C2, P) > 0, then C1 ≻P C2; (ii) if
scoreds(C1,C2, P) = 0, then C1 =P C2; (iii) if scoreds(C1,C2, P) < 0, then C2 ≻P C1.
Proof. We start by proving (i). Let P be a voting situation such that scoreds(C1,C2, P) > 0. For the
sake of contradiction we assume that C2 P C1.
The idea of the proof is to perform a sequence of transformations of P so that the result according
to fk does not change (due to the imposed axioms), but, eventually, in the resulting profile each
voter puts committees C1 and C2 either on positions I∗1 , I
∗
2 or the other way round. Let t be the total
number of transformations that we perform to achieve this and let Pi be the voting situation that
we obtain after the i-th transformation. We will ensure that for each voting situation Pi it holds that
scoreds(C1,C2, Pi) > 0 and C2 Pi C1. In particular, for the final voting situation Pt we will have
C2 Pt C1, scoreds(C1,C2, Pt) > 0, and each voter will have committees C1 and C2 on positions I∗1
and I∗2 or the other way round. Therefore, we will have:
Pt = x(C1 → I∗1,C2 → I∗2) + y(C1 → I∗2 ,C2 → I∗1)
for some nonnegative integers x and y, and by Lemmas 2 and 4 we will have:
scoreds(C1,C2, Pt) = xds(I∗1 , I∗2) + yds(I∗2 , I∗1) = x − y
However, from scoreds(C1,C2, Pt) > 0 we will conclude that x > y, i.e., there must be more voters
who put C1 and C2 on positions I∗1 and I
∗
2 than on positions I
∗
2 and I
∗
1 . By our choice of I
∗
1 and I
∗
2
(recall Equation (6) as in the proof of Lemma 4) we will conclude that C1 ≻Pt C2. This will be a
contradiction with C2 Pt C1.
We now describe the transformations. We set P0 = P. We perform the i-th transformation in the
following way. If for each voter in Pi−1, committees C1 and C2 stand on positions I∗1 and I
∗
2 (or the
other way round), we finish our sequence of transformations. Otherwise, we take a preference order
of an arbitrary voter from Pi−1, for whom the set of committee positions of C1 and C2 is not {I∗1, I
∗
2}.
Let us denote this voter by vi. Let z denote the number of voters in Pi−1 who rank C1 and C2 on the
same positions as vi, including vi (so z ≥ 1). Let I1 and I2 denote the positions of the committees C1
and C2 in the preference order of vi, respectively. Let ǫ = scoreds(C1,C2, Pi−1)/2z > 0.
Case 1: If C1 =
[
v(C1 → I1,C2 → I2)]C2, then we obtain Pi by removing from Pi−1 all z voters
with the same preference order as vi. By consistency of fk, it follows that in the resulting
voting situation Pi it still holds that C2 Pi C1 (this is, in essence, the same canceling out of
voters that we already used in Lemmas 2 and 3). Also, by definition of ∆I1,I2 in Equation (8),
we have ∆I1,I2 = 0. Hence, it still holds that scoreds(C1,C2, Pi) > 0.
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Case 2: If C1 ≻
[
v(C1 → I1,C2 → I2)] C2, then let x and y be such integers that ∆I1 ,I2 − ǫ < yx <
∆I1 ,I2 (recall that ǫ is defined just above Case 1, and that z is the number of voters with the
same preference order as vi). We define two new voting situations:
Ri−1 = z · P
y(C1→I∗1 ,C2→I∗2)
x(C1→I2,C2→I1) and Qi−1 = x · Pi−1 + Ri−1.
From Lemma 3 it follows that C2 ≻Ri−1 C1 and, by consistency, we get that C2 ≻Qi−1 C1.
Let us now calculate scored(C1,C2,Ri−1). We note that Ri−1 consists of zx voters who rank
C1 and C2 on positions I2 and I1 (and who contribute zx∆I2 ,I1 = −zx∆I1 ,I2 to the value of
scored(C1,C2,Ri−1)) and of zy voters who rank C1 and C2 on positions I∗1 and I∗2 , respectively
(who contribute value zy∆I∗1 ,I∗2 = zy). That is, we have scored(C1,C2,Ri−1) = −zx∆I1,I2 + zy.
Further, by definition of ǫ, we have that scored(C1,C2, Pi−1) = 2zǫ. In consequence, we have
that:
scored(C1,C2, Qi−1) = x · scored(C1,C2, Pi−1) + scored(C1,C2,Ri−1)
= 2zxǫ + (−zx∆I1 ,I2 + zy)
= 2zxǫ + zx(−∆I1 ,I2 +
y
x
) ≥ 2zxǫ − zxǫ > 0.
The first inequality (in the final row) follows from the fact that we assumed ∆I1,I2 − ǫ < yx <
∆I1 ,I2 . We now move on to Case 3, where we also build voting situation Qi−1 with a similar
property, and then describe how to obtain Pi from Qi−1’s.
Case 3: If C2 ≻
[
v(C1 → I1,C2 → I2)] C1, then our reasoning is very similar to that from Case 2.
Let x and y be such integers that −∆I1,I2 <
y
x
< −∆I1,I2 + ǫ. We define two voting situations
Ri−1 = z · P
y(C1→I∗2 ,C2→I∗1)
x(C1→I2,C2→I1) and Qi−1 = x · Pi−1 + Ri−1.
Lemma 3 implies that C2 ≻Ri−1 C1, and, thus, from consistency, we get that C2 ≻Qi−1 C1.
Further, using similar analysis as in Case 2, we get that:
scored(C1,C2, Qi−1) = x · scored(C1,C2, Pi−1) + zx∆I2 ,I1 − zy
= 2zxǫ + zx(−∆I1 ,I2 −
y
x
) ≥ 2zxǫ − zxǫ > 0.
The first inequality (in the final row) follows from the assumption that −∆I1 ,I2 < yx < −∆I1,I2 +
ǫ. Below we describe how to obtain Pi from Qi−1 (for both Cases 2 and 3).
In Cases 2 and 3, in the voting situation Qi−1 exactly zx voters have C1 and C2 on positions I2
and I1, respectively (for both cases, these voters are introduced in voting situation Ri−1). Further,
there are exactly zx voters who rank C1 and C2 on positions I1 and I2, respectively (these are the
cloned-x-times voters that were originally in Pi−1). We define Pi as Qi−1 with these 2zx voters
removed. Since we removed the same number of voters who rank C1 and C2 on positions I2 and I1,
respectively, as the number of voters who rank these committees on positions I1 and I2, respectively,
we conclude that scored(C1,C2, Pi) = scored(C1,C2, Qi−1) > 0 and that C2 Pi C1.
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We note that after the just-described transformation none of the voters has both C1 and C2 on
positions I1 and I2, respectively, and that we only added a number of voters that rank C1 and C2
on positions I∗1 and I
∗
2 (or the other way round) or we cloned voters already present. Hence, if we
perform such transformations for all possible pairs of committee positions I1 and I2, we will obtain
our final voting situation, Pt, for which it holds that the following three conditions are satisfied: (i)
scored(C1,C2, Pt) > 0, (ii) C2 Pt C1, and (iii) in Pt each voter ranks C1 and C2 on positions I∗1 and
I∗2 (or the other way round). Given (i) and (iii) we conclude that in Pt there are more votes in which
C1 stands on position I∗1 and C2 stands on position I
∗
2 than there are voters where the opposite holds.
However, this implies that C1 ≻Pt C2 and contradicts the fact that C2 Pt C1. This completes the
proof of the first part of the lemma.
Next, we consider part (ii) of the theorem. Let P be some voting situation such that
scored(C1,C2, P) = 0. For the sake of contradiction we assume that C2 ,P C1, and, without loss of
generality, we assume that C2 ≻P C1. Since for the voting situation v(C1 → I∗1,C2 → I∗2) it holds
that scored(C1,C2, v(C1 → I∗1,C2 → I∗2)) > 0, then for each n ∈ N, in the voting situation
Qn = nP + v(C1 → I∗1,C2 → I∗2),
we have scored(C1,C2, Qn) > 0, and—from part (i) of the theorem—we get that C1 ≻Qn C2. On the
other hand, continuity requires that there exists some value of n such that C2 ≻Qn C1.
To prove part (iii) of the theorem, it suffices to observe that if scoreds (C1,C2, P) < 0, then
scoreds(C2,C1, P) = −scoreds (C1,C2, P) > 0 and use part (i) of the theorem to conclude that in such
case we have C2 ≻P C1. This gives a contradiction and completes the proof. 
Completing the Proof of Theorem B. We have dealt with a fixed pair of committees (C1,C2)
and we have proven Lemma 5 which justifies that ds is a decision scoring function for fC1,C2 . From
neutrality it follows that ds will give us a decision scoring function for fk,s. However, as we noted at
the beginning of this section, fk can be viewed as a collection of independent functions fk,s for s ∈
{0 . . . k − 1}, thus this observation is sufficient to prove Theorem B, a Young-Style characterization
of decision scoring rules.
5.2 The Tools to Deal with Committee Scoring Rules
We have proved Theorem B, which will serve as a useful tool for proving Theorem A. However,
to complete the proof of Theorem A we still need to derive one more technical tool—Lemma 7
below—that applies the results obtained so far to committee scoring rules. To achieve this goal, we
need to change our domain from Nm! to Qm!, and before we make this change, we need to introduce
several new notions. (While the correctness of our first domain change relied on the decision rule
being symmetric, this second domain change, similarly to the case considered by Young [60], uses
our further axioms.)
We distinguish one specific voting situation, e = 〈1, 1, . . . , 1〉, called the null profile, describ-
ing the setting where each possible vote is cast exactly once. It immediately follows that under
each symmetric k-decision rule fk, each two committees are ranked equally in e, i.e., for each two
committees C1,C2 we have C1 =e C2.
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Definition 8 (Independence of Symmetric Profiles). A symmetric k-decision rule fk is independent
of symmetric profiles if for every voting situation P ∈ Nm! and for every ℓ ∈ N, we have that
fk(P + ℓe) = fk(P).
Definition 9 (Homogeneity). A symmetric k-decision rule fk is homogeneous if for every voting
situation P ∈ Nm! and for every ℓ ∈ N, we have fk(ℓP) = fk(P).
Intuitively, independence of symmetric profiles says that if we add one copy of each possible
vote then they will all cancel each other out. Homogeneity says that the result of an election depends
only on the relative proportions of the linear orders in the voting situation and not on the exact
numbers of linear orders. One can verify that each symmetric and consistent k-decision rule satisfies
both independence of symmetric profiles and homogeneity (indeed, the requirement in the definition
of homogeneity is a special case of the requirement from the definition of consistency).11
Second Domain Change. Now we are ready to extend our domain from Nm! to Qm!. To this end,
we use the following result. It was originally stated for single-winner rules but it can be adapted to
the multiwinner setting in a straightforward way.
Lemma 6 (Young [60], Merlin [41]). Suppose a k-decision rule fk : Nm! → (S k(A) × S k(A) →
{−1, 0, 1}) is symmetric, independent of symmetric profiles and homogeneous. There exists a unique
extension of fk to the domain Qm! (which we also denote by fk), satisfying for each positive ℓ ∈ N,
and P ∈ Nm! the following two conditions:
1. fk(P − ℓe) = fk(P),
2. fk
(
P
ℓ
)
= fk(P).
Lemma 6 allows us to consider voting situations with fractional numbers of linear orders. From
now on, when we speak of voting situations, we mean voting situations from our new domain, Qm!.
We note that within our new domain, the score of a pair (C1,C2) of committees relative to a voting
situation P under decision scoring function d can still be expressed as in Equation (3). Indeed, for
decision scoring rules, this definition gives the unique extension that Lemma 6 speaks of. Thus
Theorem B extends to decision rules with domain Qm!.
Constructing a Tool for Committee Scoring Rules. Since Qm! is a vector space over the field of
rational numbers, from Theorem B (extended to Qm!) we infer that for each two committees C1 and
C2, the space of voting situations P such that C1 =P C2 is a hyperplane in the m!-dimensional vector
space of all voting situations. This is so, because if we treat a voting situation P as a vector of m!
variables, then condition scored(C1,C2, P) = 0 turns out to be a single linear equation. Hence, the
space of voting situations P such that C1 =P C2 is a hyperplane in Qm! and has dimension m! − 1.
This can be summarized as the following corollary.
11The reader may ask why do we introduce independence of symmetric profiles and homogeneity, when what we
require from them already follows from consistency. The reason is that, we believe, these two properties better explain—
on the intuitive level—why the second domain change is allowed.
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Corollary 1. The set {P ∈ Qm! : C1 =P C2} is a hyperplane in the vector space of all voting
situations Qm!.
From now on, we assume that our k-decision rule fk is transitive, that is, we require that for each
voting situation P and each three committees C1, C2, and C3 it holds that:
(C1 P C2) and (C2 P C3) implies (C1 P C3).
In other words, from now on we require fk to be a k-winner election rule.
Lemma 7. Let fk be a symmetric, consistent, committee-dominant, continuous k-winner election
rule, and let λ : [m]k → R be a committee scoring function. If it holds that for each two committees
C1 and C2 and each voting situation P it holds that the committee scores of C1 and C2 are equal
(according to λ) if and only C1 and C2 are equivalent according to fk, then it holds that: For each
two committees C1 and C2 and each voting situation P, if the committee score of C1 is greater than
that of C2 (according to λ) then C1 is preferred over C2 according to fk (i.e., C1 ≻P C2).
Proof. Based on λ, we build a decision scoring function g as follows. For each two committee
positions I1 and I2, we have g(I1, I2) = λ(I1) − λ(I2). The score of a committee pair (C1,C2) in
voting situation P under g is given by:
scoreg(C1,C2, P) =
∑
π∈Π>(A)
P(π) · g(posπ(C1), posπ(C2)).
Let us fix x ∈ [k − 1] and two arbitrary committees C∗1 and C∗2 such that |C∗1 ∩ C∗2| = x. We note
that, by the assumptions of the theorem, if it holds that:
scoreg(C∗1,C∗2, P) = 0 ⇐⇒ C∗1 =P C∗2,
then, by Corollary 1, H = {P ∈ Qm! : C∗1 =P C
∗
2)} is an (m! − 1)-dimensional hyperplane. More so,
this is the same hyperplane as the following two (where d = dx is the decision scoring function from
the thesis of Lemma 5, built for fk):
{P ∈ Qm! : scoreg(C∗1,C∗2, P) = 0} and {P ∈ Qm! : scored(C∗1,C∗2, P) = 0},
We claim that for C∗1 and C
∗
2 one of the following conditions must hold:
1. For each voting situation P, if scoreg(C∗1,C∗2, P) > 0 then C∗1 ≻P C∗2.
2. For each voting situation P, if scoreg(C∗1,C∗2, P) > 0 then C∗2 ≻P C∗1.
Why is this so? For the sake of contradiction, let us assume that there exist two voting situations,
P and Q, such that scoreg(C∗1,C∗2, P) > 0 and scoreg(C∗1,C∗2, Q) > 0, but C∗1 P C∗2 and C∗2 Q C∗1.
From the fact that scoreg(C∗1,C∗2, P) > 0 and scoreg(C∗1,C∗2, Q) > 0, we see that the points P and Q
lie on the same side of hyperplane H and neither of them lies on H. From C∗1 P C
∗
2, C
∗
2 Q C
∗
1,
and from Lemma 5, we see that scored(C∗1,C∗2, P) ≥ 0 and scored(C∗1,C∗2, Q) ≤ 0. That is, at least
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one of the voting situations P and Q lies on the hyperplane, or they both lie on different sides of the
hyperplane. This gives a contradiction and proves our claim.
Now, using the committee dominance axiom, we exclude the second possibility. For each i ∈
[m − k + 1] we set Ii = {i, i + 1, . . . , i + k − 1}. Let I and J denote, respectively, the best possible and
the worst possible position of a committee, i.e., I = I1 and J = Im−k+1. For the sake of contradiction,
let us assume that there exists a profile P′, where scoreg(C∗1,C∗2, P′) > 0 and C∗2 ≻P′ C∗1. Since
there exists a profile with scoreg(C∗1,C∗2, P′) > 0, it must be the case that λ(I) > λ(J) (otherwise λ
would be a constant function). Thus there must exist p such that λ(Ip) > λ(Ip+k−x). Let us consider a
profile S consisting of a single vote where C∗1 stands on position Ip and C
∗
2 stands on position Ip+k−x
(as |C∗1 ∩ C∗2| = x, this is possible). Since λ(Ip) > λ(Ip+k−x), we have that scoreg(C∗1,C∗2, S ) > 0.
By committee-dominance of fk, it follows that C∗1 S C∗2. However, from the reasoning in the
preceding paragraph (applied to profile S ), we know that either C∗1 ≻S C∗2 or C∗2 ≻S C∗1. Putting
these two facts together, we conclude that C∗1 ≻S C
∗
2. Since we have shown a single profile S such
that scoreg(C∗1,C∗2, S ) > 0 and C∗1 ≻S C∗2, by the argument from the previous paragraph, we know
that for every profile P it holds that:
If scoreg(C∗1,C∗2, P) > 0 then C∗1 ≻P C∗2.
Our choice of committees C∗1 and C
∗
2 was arbitrary and, thus, the above implication holds for all
pairs of committees. This completes the proof. 
Due to Lemma 7, in our further discussion, given a symmetric, consistent, committee-dominant,
continuous k-winner election rule fk we can focus solely on the subspace {P : C1 =P C2}. If we
manage to show that committees C1 and C2 are equivalent if and only if the score of C1 is equal to
the score of C2 according to some committee scoring function λ, then we can conclude that fk is
a committee scoring rule defined by this committee scoring function λ. This important observation
concludes the first part of the proof.
5.3 Second Part of the Proof: Committees with All but One Candidate in Common
We now start the second part of the proof. The current section is independent from the results of
the previous one, but we do use all the notation that was introduced and, in particular, we consider
voting situations over Qm!. We will use results from Sections 5.1 and 5.2 only in Section 5.4, where
we conclude the whole proof.
The Setting and Our Goal. As before, the size of committees is denoted as k. Throughout this
section we assume fk to be a k-winner election rule that is symmetric, consistent, committee-
dominant, and continuous. Our goal is to show that as long as we consider committees that contain
some k − 1 fixed members and can differ only in the final one, fk acts on such committee pairs
as a committee scoring rule. The discussion in this section is inspired by that of Young [60] and
Merlin [41], but the main part of our analysis is original (in particular Lemma 11).
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Position-Difference Function. Let P be a voting situation in Qm!, C be some size-k committee,
and I be a committee position. We define the weight of position I with respect to C within P as:
pos-weightI(C, P) =
∑
π∈Π>(A) : posπ(C)=I
P(π),
That is, pos-weightI(C, P) is the (rational) number of votes in which committee C is ranked on
position I.
For each two committees C1,C2 such that |C1 ∩ C2| = k − 1, we define a committee position-
difference function αC1,C2 : Qm! → Q(
m
k) that for each voting situation P ∈ Qm! returns a vector of(
m
k
)
elements, indexed by committee positions (i.e., elements of [m]k), such that for each committee
position I, we have:
αC1,C2(P)[I] = pos-weightI(C1, P) − pos-weightI(C2, P).
Naturally, αC1,C2(P) is a linear function of P. We claim that for each voting situation P, we have:∑
I∈[m]k
αC1,C2 (P)[I] = 0. (20)
To see why this is the case, we note that ∑I∈[m]k pos-weightI(C1, P) = ∑π∈Π>(A) P(π) because every
vote is accounted exactly once. Thus, we have that:
∑
I∈[m]k
αC1,C2(P)[I] =
∑
I∈[m]k
(
pos-weightI(C1, P) − pos-weightI(C2, P)
)
=
∑
I∈[m]k
pos-weightI(C1, P) −
∑
J∈[m]k
pos-weightJ(C2, P)
=
∑
π∈Π>(A)
P(π) −
∑
π′∈Π>(A)
P(π′) = 0.
Position-difference functions will be important technical tools that we will soon use in the proof
(in particular, in Lemma 11 we will show that if αC1,C2(P) = 〈0, . . . , 0〉 then C1 =P C2 ). However,
we need to provide some more tools first.
Johnson Graphs and Hamiltonian Paths. We will need the following graph-theoretic results to
build certain votes and preference profiles in our following analysis. We mention that the graphs
that Lemmas 8 and 9 speak of are called Johnson graphs. Lemma 8 was known before (we found
the result in the work of Asplach [4] and could not trace an earlier reference12), and we provide the
proof for the sake of completeness.
12We suspect the results might have been known before the work of Asplach. Indeed, similar results appear in the form
of algorithms that output all size-k subsets of a given set in the order so that each two consecutive sets differ in only one
element. Yet, we need the specific variants provided in Lemmas 8 and 9 that finish the Hamiltonian path on a specific
vertex. Asplach [4] does not mention directly that his proofs provide this property, but close inspection shows that this is
the case.
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Lemma 8. Let p and j be integers such that 1 ≤ j ≤ p. Let G( j, p) be a graph constructed in the
following way. We associate j-element subsets of {1, . . . p} with vertices and we say that two vertices
are connected if the corresponding subsets differ by exactly one element (they have j − 1 elements
in common). Such a graph contains a Hamiltonian path, i.e., a path that visits each vertex exactly
once, that starts from the set {1, . . . , j} and ends in the set {p − j + 1, . . . , p}.
Proof. We prove this lemma by induction over j and p. For j = 1 and for each p ≥ 1, it is easy
to see that the required path exists (in this case, the graph is simply a full clique). This provides
the induction base. For the inductive step, we assume that there are two numbers, p′ and j′, such
that for each p and j ( j ≤ p) such that p < p′ and j < j′ it holds that graph G( j, p) contains a
Hamiltonian path satisfying the constraints from the lemma. We will prove that such a path also
exists for G( j′, p′).
We partition the set of vertices of G( j′, p′) into p′ − j + 1 groups V( j′, p′, 1), . . . ,V( j′, p′, p′ −
j + 1), where for each x ∈ {1, . . . , p′ − j + 1}, group V( j′, p′, x) consists of all sets of j elements
(vertices of the graph) such that x is the lowest among them.
We build our Hamiltonian path for G( j′, p′) as follows. We start with the vertex {1, . . . , j′}. By
our inductive hypothesis, we know that there is a path that starts with {1, . . . , j′}, traverses all vertices
in V( j′, p′, 1), and ends in {1, p′ − j′ + 2, . . . , p′}. From {1, p′ − j′ + 2, . . . , p′} we can go, over a
single edge, to {2, p′ − j′ + 2, . . . , p′}. Starting with this vertex, by our inductive hypothesis, we can
traverse all the vertices of V( j′, p′, 2). Then, over a single edge, we can move to some vertex from
V( j′, p′, 3), traverse all the vertices there, and so on. By repeating this procedure, we will eventually
reach some vertex in the set V( j′, p′, p′− j′ +1). However, V( j′, p′, p′ − j′ +1) contains exactly one
vertex, {p′ − j′ + 1, . . . , p′}. This means that we have found the desired Hamiltonian path. 
Lemma 9. Let r, p and j be integers such that 1 ≤ r ≤ p and 1 ≤ j ≤ p−1. Let ˜G( j, p, r) be a graph
constructed in the following way: (i) A j-element subset of {1, . . . , p} is a vertex of ˜G( j, p, r) if and
only if it contains at least one element smaller than r. (ii) There is an edge between two vertices if
they differ in exactly one element (i.e., if they have j−1 elements in common). Such a graph contains
a Hamiltonian path.
Proof. The proof is very similar to the previous one. We partition the set of vertices of ˜G( j, p, r) into
r − 1 groups V( j, p, 1), . . . ,V( j, p, r − 1), where for each x ∈ {1, . . . , r − 1}, group V( j, p, x) consists
of all the sets (i.e., all the vertices) such that x is their smallest member.
We build our Hamiltonian path for ˜G( j, p, r) as follows. We start with the vertex {1, . . . , j}. By
Lemma 8, we can continue the path from {1, . . . , j}, traverse all vertices in V( j, p, 1), and end in
{1, p− j+ 2, . . . , p}. From {1, p− j+ 2, . . . , p} we can go, over a single edge, to {2, p− j+ 2, . . . , p},
and we can traverse all vertices in V( j, p, 2). Then we can go, over a single edge, to some vertex
from V( j, p, 3), and we can continue in the same way as in the proof of Lemma 8. 
The Range of αC1,C2 . Let us consider two distinct committees C1 and C2. Using Lemma 8, we
establish the dimension of the range of function αC1,C2 . This result will be useful in the proof of
Lemma 11.
Lemma 10. For two committees, C1 and C2, the range of the function αC1,C2 has dimension
(
m
k
)
− 1.
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Proof. From Equation (20), we get that the dimension of the range of function αC1,C2 is at most(
m
k
)
− 1. Now, let us consider graph G = G(k,m) from Lemma 8 and the Hamiltonian path specified
in this lemma. Note that we can understand each vertex in G as a committee position. For each edge
(I, I′) on our Hamiltonian path, consider a single vote where C1 stands on position I and C2 stands
on position I′. For such a vote, αC1,C2 returns a vector with all zeros except a single 1 on position
I and a single −1 on position I′. It is easy to observe that there are
(
m
k
)
− 1 such votes and that so
constructed vectors are linearly independent. 
(C1,C2)-Symmetric Profiles. The final tool that we need to provide before we prove Lemma 11 is
the definition of (C1, C2)-symmetric profiles. Suppose σ is a permutation of A. Then we can extend
its action to linear orders and voting situations in the natural way.
Definition 10. Let C1 and C2 be two size-k committees. We say that a voting situation P is (C1, C2)-
symmetric if there exists a permutation of the set of candidates σ and a sequence of committees
F1, F2, . . . , Fx such that P = σ(P) and:
1. C1 = F1 = Fx and C2 = F2,
2. for each i ∈ [x − 1] it holds that σ(Fi) = Fi+1.
If a voting situation P is (C1, C2)-symmetric then we know that C1 =P C2. Why is this the case? For
the sake of contradiction let us assume that C1 ,P C2, and, without loss of generality, that C1 ≻P C2.
From C1 ≻P C2 (which translates to F1 ≻P F2) by neutrality of fk we infer that F2 ≻σ(P) F3, thus
that F2 ≻P F3. By the same arguments, we get that F1 ≻P F2 ≻P F3 ≻P · · · ≻P Fx. In consequence,
we get that C1 ≻P C1, a contradiction.
Further, we observe that for each (C1, C2)-symmetric voting situation P it holds that αC1,C2 (P) =
〈0, . . . , 0〉. Indeed, if σ is as in Definition 10, we note that since σ(C1) = C2 and since σ(P) = P,
for each (fractional) vote in P where committee C1 stands on some position I we can uniquely
assign a (fractional) vote in P where committee C2 stands on the same position I. This shows that
αC1,C2(P)[I] is a vector of non-positive numbers. By an analogous argument (using the fact that
σ(−1)(C2) = C1 and σ(−1)(P) = P) we infer that αC1,C2(P)[I] is a vector of nonnegative numbers,
and, so, we conclude that αC1,C2(P) = 〈0, . . . , 0〉.
Inferring Committee Equivalence Using αC1 ,C2 . We are ready to present Lemma 11, our main
technical tool required in this part of the proof. On the intuitive level, it says that for |C1∩C2| = k−1
the information provided by the function αC1,C2 in relation to a profile P is sufficient to distinguish
whether C1 is equivalent to C2 with respect to P.
Lemma 11. For each two committees C1,C2 ∈ S k(A) such that |C1∩C2| = k−1 and for each voting
situation P ∈ Qm!, if αC1,C2(P) = 〈0, . . . , 0〉 then C1 =P C2.
Proof. The kernel of a linear function is the space of all vectors for which this function returns
the zero vector. In particular, the kernel of αC1 ,C2 , denoted ker(αC1 ,C2), is the space of all voting
situations P such that αC1,C2(P) = 〈0, . . . , 0〉. Since the domain of function αC1 ,C2 has dimension m!
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and, by Lemma 10, its range has dimension
(
m
k
)
− 1, the kernel of αC1,C2 has dimension m!−
(
m
k
)
+ 1.
We will construct a base of this kernel that will consists of (C1, C2)-symmetric voting situations
only. Since for each (C1, C2)-symmetric voting situation P it holds that C1 =P C2 and αC1,C2(P) =
〈0, . . . , 0〉, by consistency of fk and linearity of αC1,C2 we will prove the conclusion of the theorem.
We prove the statement by a two-dimensional induction on k (the committee size) and m (the
size of the set of candidates). As a base for the induction we will show that the property holds for
k = 1 and all values of m. For the inductive step we will show that from the fact that the property
holds for committee size j − 1 and for p − 1 candidates it follows that the property also holds for
committee size j and for p candidates. This will allow us to conclude that the property holds for all
values of m and k with m ≥ k.
For k = 1 and for an arbitrary value of m, the problem collapses to the single-winner setting. It
has been shown by Young [60] (and by Merlin [41]) that for each two candidates c1 and c′1, there
exists a base of ker(α{c1},{c′1}) that consists of m! − (m − 1) voting situations which are ({c1}, {c′1})-
symmetric. This gives us the base for the induction.
Let us now prove the inductive step. We want to show that the statement is satisfied for
Ap = {a1, a2, . . . ap}, C1, j = {a1, a2, . . . , a j} and C2, j = {a′1, a2, . . . , a j}, where we set a
′
1 = a j+1.
(We note that since fk is symmetric, the exact names of the candidates we use here are irrelevant,
and we picked these for notational convenience.) From the sets Ap, C1, j and C2, j we take out ele-
ment a j and get Ap−1 = {a1, a2, . . . , a j−1, a j+1, . . . ap}, C1,( j−1) = {a1, a2, . . . , a j−1} and C2,( j−1) =
{a′1, a2, . . . , a j−1}. Let V j−1 be a base of ker(αC1,( j−1),C2,( j−1)) that consists of (C1,( j−1), C2,( j−1))-
symmetric voting situations. We know that it exists from the induction hypothesis. We also know that
it consists of (p−1)!−
(
p−1
j−1
)
+1 voting situations. We now build the desired base for ker(αC1, j ,C2, j ) us-
ing V j−1 as the starting point. Our base has to consist of p!−
(
p
j
)
+1 linearly independent, (C1, j, C2, j)-
symmetric voting situations.
First, for each voting situation P ∈ V j−1 and for each r ∈ {1, . . . p} we create a voting situation Pr
as follows. We take each vote v in P and we put a j in the r-th position of v, pushing the candidates
on positions r, r + 1, r + 2, . . . back by one position, but keeping their relative order unchanged.
There are p! − p
(
p−1
j−1
)
+ p such vectors and it is easy to see that they are linearly independent. Let
us refer to the set of these vectors as B1. Naturally, the vectors from B1 do not span the whole space
ker(α{a1 ,...,a j},{a′1,...,a j}); there is simply too few of them. However, there is also a certain structural
reason for this and understanding this reason will help us further in the proof. Let lin(B1) denote the
set of linear combinations of voting situations from B1. For each r ∈ {1, . . . , p} and each T ∈ lin(B1),
let T (a j → r) denote the voting situation that consists of all votes from T which have a j on the r-th
position. We can see that for each r ∈ {1, . . . , p} and each T ∈ lin(B1), it holds that αC1, j ,C2, j (T (a j →
r)) = 〈0, . . . , 0〉 (the reason for this is that T (a j → r) is, in essence, a linear combination of voting
situations from V j−1, with a j inserted at position r) . This property certainly does not hold for all the
voting situations in ker(α{a1 ,...,a j},{a′1,...,a j}).
We now form the second part of our base, denoted B2 and consisting of p
(
p−1
j−1
)
·
j−1
j − (p − 1)
voting situations ((C1, j, C2, j)-symmetric and linearly independent from each other and all the voting
situations in B1). We start constructing each voting situation in B2 by constructing its distinctive
vote. To construct a distinctive vote, we first select the position for candidate a j; we consider each
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position from {1, . . . , p}. Let us fix r ∈ {1, . . . , p} as the position that we picked. Next, we select a set
of j positions for the candidates from {a1, . . . , a j−1, a′1}. To do that, we first construct the following
graph. We associate all sets of j − 1 positions such that r is greater13 than at least one of them with
vertices (for a fixed r there are
(
p−1
j−1
)
−
(
p−r
j−1
)
such vertices; we choose j−1 positions out of p−1 still
available, but we omit the situations where all these j − 1 positions are greater than r). We say that
two vertices are connected if the corresponding sets differ by exactly one element. From Lemma 9 it
follows that such a graph contains a Hamiltonian path. Now, for each edge (X, X′) on the considered
Hamiltonian path we do the following. Let B = X ∩ X′, and let b and b′ be the two elements such
that b < b′ and {b, b′} = (X \ B)∪ (X′ \ B). (In other words, b and b′ are the two elements on which
X and X′ differ.) Note that |B| = j−2. We form a distinctive vote by putting candidate a j on position
r, candidates a2, . . . , a j−1 on the positions from B (in some arbitrary order), a1 on position b, a′1 on
position b′, and all the other candidates on the remaining positions (in some arbitrary order).
How many distinctive votes have we constructed? There are p possible values for the position
of a j, and for each such position we consider a graph. If the position of a j is r, then the graph has(
p−1
j−1
)
−
(
p−r
j−1
)
vertices. Thus, altogether, the number of vertices is:
p∑
r=1
((
p − 1
j − 1
)
−
(
p − r
j − 1
))
= p
(
p − 1
j − 1
)
−
p∑
r=1
(
p − r
j − 1
)
= p
(
p − 1
j − 1
)
−
(
p
j
)
= p
(
p − 1
j − 1
)
−
p
j
(
p − 1
j − 1
)
= p
(
p − 1
j − 1
) j − 1
j ,
where the second equality follows from the following property of binomial coefficients: for m, n ∈ N
we have
∑n
k=0
( k
m
)
=
(
n+1
m+1
)
. (An intuitive way to obtain the same result is as follows. Let us fix
the value r chosen uniformly at random. The vertices for the graph for this value of r are size-
( j − 1) subsets of p − 1 positions, except those subsets that contain only elements greater than r.
By symmetry, on the average the number of subsets that we omit is a 1/j fraction of all the subsets.
Since we have all the graphs for all values of r, altogether we have p
(
p−1
j−1
) j−1
j vertices.) One of the
graphs is empty (it is the one that is constructed for r = 1, because there is no element in {1, . . . , p}
lower than r = 1). Thus we have p − 1 non-empty graphs. As a result, the total number of edges
in the considered Hamiltonian paths is p
(
p−1
j−1
) j−1
j − (p − 1). Every edge corresponds to a distinctive
vote, so this is also the number of distinctive votes constructed.
For each distinctive vote v constructed, we build the following voting situation:
Case 1. If a1 and a′1 are both ranked ahead of a j, then we let τ be permutation τ := (a1, a j, a′1) (i.e.,
we let τ be the identity permutation except that τ(a1) = a j, τ(a j) = a′1, τ(a′1) = a1) and we let
the voting situation consist of three votes, v, τ(v), and τ(2)(v):
v : · · · ≻ a1 ≻ · · · ≻ a
′
1 ≻ · · · ≻ a j ≻ · · ·
τ(v) : · · · ≻ a j ≻ · · · ≻ a1 ≻ · · · ≻ a′1 ≻ · · ·
τ(2)(v) : · · · ≻ a′1 ≻ · · · ≻ a j ≻ · · · ≻ a1 ≻ · · ·
13There is a possible point of confusion here. By “greater” we mean greater as a number. So, for example, position 7 is
greater than position 5 (even though we would say that a candidate ranked on position 5 is ranked higher than candidate
ranked on position 7).
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Note that permutation τ and the sequence F1 = {a1, . . . , a j}, F2 = {a2, . . . , a j, a′1}, F3 =
{a1, . . . , a j−1, a′1}, F4 = {a1, . . . , a j} witness that this voting situation is (C1, j, C2, j)-symmetric.
Case 2. If it is not the case that a1 and a′1 are both ranked ahead of a j in distinctive vote v, then
we know that there is some other candidate a ∈ {a2, . . . , a j−1} ranked ahead of a j. This is due
to our construction of distinctive votes—we always put a j on position r and make sure that
there is some candidate ranked on a position ahead of r. If all the candidates a2, . . . , a j−1 were
ranked behind a j, then it would have to be the case that both a1 and a′1 are ranked ahead of
a j.14 Since it is not the case that both a1 and a′1 are ranked ahead of a j, there must be some
other candidate from {a2, . . . , a j−1} that is. We call this candidate a. We let ρ be permutation
ρ := (a1, a′1)(a, a j) (i.e., we let ρ be the identity permutation, except that it swaps a1 with a′1
and a with a j). We form a voting situation that consists of v and ρ(v):
v : · · · ≻ a ≻ · · · ≻ a j ≻ · · · ≻ a1 ≻ · · · ≻ a′1 ≻ · · ·
ρ(v) : · · · ≻ a j ≻ · · · ≻ a ≻ · · · ≻ a′1 ≻ · · · ≻ a1 ≻ · · ·
Permutation ρ and the sequence F1 = {a1, . . . , a j}, F2 = {a2, . . . , a j, a′1}, F3 = {a1, . . . , a j}
witness that this is a (C1, j, C2, j)-symmetric voting situation.
Let B2 consists of all the voting situations constructed from the distinctive votes.
For each r ∈ {1, . . . , p}, each set of j−1 positions R from {1, . . . , p}\{r}, and each voting situation
P, we define γr,R(P) to be the total (possibly fractional) number of votes from P that have a j on the
r-th position and that have candidates from {a1, a2, . . . , a j−1} on positions from R. We define γ′r,R(P)
analogously, for the votes where a j is on position r and candidates a′1, a2, . . . , a j−1 take positions
from R. We define βr,R(P) to be γr,R(P)−γ′r,R(P). For example, for each P ∈ B1 we have βr,R(P) = 0.
Let us consider voting situations from B2 which were created from a single Hamiltonian path in
one of the graphs. The distinctive votes for all these voting situations have a j on the same position;
we denote this position by r. For each such voting situation P, each non-distinctive vote belonging
to P has a j on a position ahead of position r. Further, we see that there exist exactly two sets R1
and R2 such that βr,R1(P) , 0 and βr,R2(P) , 0. These are the sets that correspond to the vertices
connected by the edge from which the distinctive vote for P was created (for one of them, let us
say R1, we have βr,R1(P) = 1, and for the other we have βr,R2(P) = −1; to see that this holds, recall
that a j is ranked on positions ahead of r in non-distinctive votes and, thus, it suffices to consider the
distinctive vote only).
Now we are ready to explain why the vectors from B1 ∪ B2 are linearly independent. For each
nontrivial linear combination L of the vectors from B1 ∪ B2 we will show that L cannot be equal to
the zero vector. For the sake of contradiction let us assume that L = 〈0, . . . , 0〉. We start by showing
14To see why this is the case, recall how the distinctive votes are produced. We have an edge (X, X′) on a Hamiltonian
path in our graph. We set B = X ∩ X′ and {b, b′} = (X \ B) ∪ (X′ \ B). B contains positions of the candidates a2, . . . , a j−1,
whereas b and b′ are positions of a1 and a′1. Without loss of generality, we can take X = B ∪ {b} and X′ = B ∪ {b′}.
Since—by our assumption here—the positions of a2, . . . , a j−1 (i.e., the positions in B) are greater than the position of a j
(denoted r in the description of distinctive votes construction), for X and X′ to be vertices in the graph, we need both b
and b′ to be smaller than r (and, in effect, both a1 and a′1 precede a j).
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that all coefficients of vectors from B2 in L are equal to zero. Again, for the sake of contradiction let
us assume that this is not the case. Let B′2 consist of those vectors from B2 that appear in L with non-
zero coefficients. Let r be the largest position of a j in some vote in B′2 (by “largest position” we mean
largest numerically, i.e., for each vote v that occurs in some voting situation from B′2 it holds that
posv(a j) ≤ r). Let B′2,r be the set of all voting situations from B′2 that have some votes which have a j
on position r. Each voting situation in B′2,r consists of either two or three votes. However, the votes
belonging to those voting situations which have a j on position r must be distinctive votes (all non-
distinctive votes for voting situations in B2 have a j on positions ahead of r). Each such distinctive
vote is built from an edge of a single Hamiltonian path (they come from the same Hamiltonian path
because otherwise they would not have a j on the same position). Let S be a voting situation in B′2,r
that has a distinctive vote built from the latest edge on the path, among the edges that contributed
voting situations to B′2,r (to make this notion meaningful, we orient the path in one of the two
possible ways). Let R1 and R2 be the sets of j − 1 positions that form this edge. By the reasoning
from the previous paragraph we have that βr,R1(S ) , 0, βr,R2(S ) , 0, and one of the following two
conditions must hold (depending on the orientation of the Hamiltonian path that we chose):
1. For each voting situation Q′ in B′2 other than S we have βr,R1(Q′) = 0.
2. For each voting situation Q′ in B′2 other than S we have βr,R2(Q′) = 0.
Further, for each Q ∈ B1 we have βr,R1(Q) = βr,R2(Q) = 0. Thus, since βr,R1 and βr,R2 are linear
functions, we have that either βr,R1(L) , 0 or βr,R2(L) , 0. Thus, L cannot be a zero-vector, which
gives a contradiction.
We have shown that all coefficients of vectors from B2 used to form L are equal to zero. Thus
L must be a linear combination of vectors from B1. However, the vectors from B1 are linearly
independent, which means that if L is 〈0, . . . , 0〉, then the coefficients of all the vectors from B1 are
zeros. Thus we conclude that the vectors from B1 ∪ B2 are linearly independent.
It remains to show that B1 ∪ B2 indeed forms a base of the kernel of αC1, j ,C2, j . Since vectors in
B1 and B2 are linearly independent, it suffices to check that the cardinality of B1 ∪ B2 is equal to the
dimension of ker(αC1, j ,C2, j ). The number of vectors in B1 ∪ B2 is equal to:(
p! − p
(
p − 1
j − 1
)
+ p
)
︸                   ︷︷                   ︸
|B1|
+
(
p
(
p − 1
j − 1
)
·
j − 1
j − p + 1
)
︸                            ︷︷                            ︸
|B2|
= p! − pj
(
p − 1
j − 1
)
+ 1 = p! −
(
p
j
)
+ 1.
This completes our induction. The proof works for arbitrary committees C1 and C2 with |C1 ∩C2| =
k − 1 due to symmetry of fk. 
We are almost ready to show that for committees that differ by one candidate only, fk is a
committee scoring rule, and to derive its committee scoring function. However, before we do that
we need to change the domain once again. We will also need some notions from topology.
Topological Definitions. For every set S in some Euclidean space Rn, by int(S ) we mean the
interior of S , i.e., the largest (in terms of inclusion) open set contained in S . By conv(S ) we mean
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the convex hull of S , i.e., the smallest (in terms of inclusion) convex set that contains S . Finally, by
S we define the closure of S , i.e., the smallest (in terms of inclusion) closed set that contains S . We
use the concept of Q-convex sets of Young [60] and we recall his two observations.
Definition 11 (Q-convex sets). A set S ⊆ Rn is Q-convex if S ⊆ Qn and for each s1, s2 ∈ S and
each q ∈ Q, 0 ≤ q ≤ 1, it holds that q · s1 + (1 − q) · s2 ∈ S .
Lemma 12 (Young [60]). Set S ⊆ Rn is Q-convex if and only if S = Qn ∩ conv(S ).
Lemma 13 (Young [60]). If a set S is Q-convex, then S = conv(S ); moreover, S is convex.
Third Domain Change. In the following arguments, we fix two arbitrary committees C1 and C2
such that |C1 ∩ C2| = k − 1 and focus on them. (In other words, we consider function fC1,C2 instead
of fk.) In this case, Lemma 11 allows us to change the domain of the function.
Let us consider two voting situations P and Q such that αC1,C2 (P) = αC1,C2 (Q). Since αC1,C2 is a
linear function, we have αC1 ,C2(P−Q) = 〈0, . . . , 0〉. Thus, by Lemma 11, we know that C1 =P−Q C2.
We can express Q as Q = P + (Q − P) and thus, by consistency of fC1,C2 , we have that:
C1 ≻P C2 ⇐⇒ C1 ≻Q C2.
Consequently, to answer the question “what is the relation between committees C1 and C2 according
to fC1,C2 in voting situation P?” it suffices to know the value αC1 ,C2(P). This is exactly because for
any two profiles, P and Q, with the same values of function αC1,C2 the result of comparison of
committees C1 and C2 according to fC1,C2 is the same in P and Q.
In effect, we can restrict the domain of fC1 ,C2 to an
((
m
k
)
− 1
)
-dimensional space D:
D =
P ∈ Q(
m
k) :
∑
I∈[m]k
P[I] = 0
 .
We interpret elements of D as the values of the committee position-difference function αC1 ,C2 and,
so, the condition ∑I∈[m]k P[I] = 0 corresponds to the property of committee position-difference
functions given in Equation (20). By the argument given prior to the definition of D, we know that
from the point of view of comparing committees C1 and C2 using function fC1 ,C2 , the vector of
values αC1,C2 provides the same information as a voting situation from which it is obtained. Thus,
we can think of elements of D as corresponding to voting situations.
Separating Two Committees. We proceed by defining two sets, D1, D2 ⊆ D, such that:
D1 = {P ∈ D : C1 ≻P C2} and D2 = {P ∈ D : C2 ≻P C1}.
That is, D1 corresponds to situations where, according to fC1,C2 , committee C1 is preferred over C2,
and D2 corresponds to the situations where it is the other way round. From consistency of fC1,C2 , it
follows that D1 and D2 are Q-convex.
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Let us consider the case where fC1,C2 is trivial, i.e., for each voting situation it ranks C1 and C2
as equal. By neutrality, it follows that fk ranks equally each two committees C′1 and C′2, such that
|C′1 ∩ C
′
2| = k − 1. This means that fk (for committees with intersection k − 1) can be expressed
by means of the trivial committee scoring function λ ≡ 0. So let us assume that fC1,C2 is nontrivial
and there is some voting situation where it does not rank C1 and C2 equally. In this case one of the
sets D1 and D2 is nonempty. From neutrality it follows that so is the other one. Now, we move our
analysis from Q(mk) to R(mk), by analyzing the closures of the sets D1 and D2.
Lemma 14. The sets int(D1) and D2 are disjoint, convex, and nonempty relative to D (i.e., int(D1)∩
D , ∅ and D2 ∩ D , ∅).
Proof. This lemma follows from the results given by Young [60] and Merlin [41]. However, in their
cases the proofs are implicit in the text. We include an explicit proof for the sake of completeness.
From Lemma 13, it follows that the sets D1 and D2 are convex and, thus, the interior int(D1) is
also convex. Now, we prove that D1 ∪ D2 = D, a fact that will be useful in our further analysis. If
this is not the case, then D − (D1 ∪ D2) is open in D. Thus, there exists a point P and an
((
m
k
)
− 1
)
-
dimensional ball B such that P ∈ B ⊆ D − (D1 ∪ D2). Naturally, C1 =P C2. Thus, for some S ∈ D1,
there exists a (small) x ∈ Q, such that Q = x · S + (1 − x) · P belongs to the ball B. Since Q belongs
to B, it must be the case that C1 =Q C2. However, by consistency of fC1,C2 , we have that C1 ≻Q C2
and, so, we have Q ∈ D1. This is a contradiction.
Next, we show that the set int(D1) is nonempty, relatively to D. For the sake of contradiction,
assume that int(D1) ∩ D = ∅. Then, from neutrality, it follows that also int(D2) ∩ D = ∅. Thus,
D1 and D2 are nowhere dense in D,15 and so are D1, D2, and D1 ∪ D2 = D. Consequently, we get
that D is nowhere dense in D, a contradiction with the density of D in D16 (density of D follows
immediately from its definition).
To see that D2∩D is nonempty, it suffices to note that fk is nontrivial (by assumptions just ahead
of the statement of the lemma) and, so, D2 is nonempty. Since D2 is a subset of both D2 and D, we
get that D2 ∩ D , ∅.
Now we show that int(D1) and D2 are disjoint. For the sake of contradiction, let us assume that
there exists P ∈ D, such that P ∈ int(D1) and P ∈ D2. From Lemma 13, we get that int(D1) =
int(conv(D1)) = int(conv(D1)). This means that P ∈ int(conv(D1))∩D2 and, so, P ∈ conv(D1)∩D2.
Since P ∈ D2, we know that P ∈ Q(mk). By Lemma 12 we know that D1 = Q(mk) ∩ conv(D1).
Thus, since P ∈ Q(mk) and P ∈ conv(D1), we know that P ∈ D1. All in all, it must be the case that
P ∈ D1 ∩ D2, which is a contradiction because D1 ∩ D2 = ∅.
Finally, for the sake of contradiction, let us assume that there exists Q ∈ D, such that Q ∈ int(D1)
and Q ∈ D2. Since Q ∈ D2, this means that every open set containing Q must have nonempty
intersection with D2. Consequently, int(D1) has nonempty intersection with D2, which—by the
previous paragraph—gives a contradiction. This completes the proof of the lemma. 
15A subset A of a topological space X is called nowhere dense (in X) if there is no neighborhood in X on which A is
dense.
16A subset A of a topological space X is dense in X if for every point x in X, each neighborhood of x contains at least
one point from A (i.e., A has non-empty intersection with every non-empty open subset of X).
36
Recovering the Scoring Function. We are finally ready to derive our committee scoring function.
From the classic hyperplane separation theorem, it follows that there exists a vector η ∈ R(mk) such
that (for P ∈ D, by η · P we mean the dot product of P and η, both treated as
(
m
k
)
dimensional
vectors):
1. For each voting situation P ∈ D2 it holds that η · P ≤ 0 .
2. For each voting situation P ∈ int(D1) it holds that η · P > 0.
We note that Lemma 14 allows us to directly apply the hyperplane separation theorem as the sets
int(D1) and D2 are disjoint.17
We now show that if P ∈ D and η · P > 0, then P ∈ D1. Since η · P > 0, P cannot belong to D2,
but it might be the case that C1 =P C2. For the sake of contradiction, let us assume that this is the
case. We observe that there exists an
((
m
k
)
− 1
)
-dimensional ball B in D with P ∈ B, such that for
each S ∈ B we have C1 S C2 (this is because P does not belong to D2). Let us now consider two
cases.
Case 1. If for each S ∈ B we have C1 =S C2, then we proceed as follows. Let us take some Q such
that C1 ≻Q C2. There must exist some (possibly very small) x such that S = x ·Q+ (1− x) ·P ∈
B. However, from consistency we would get that C1 ≻S C2, a contradiction.
Case 2. If there exists Q ∈ B such that C1 ≻Q C2, then we observe that there exists 0 < ǫ < 1
such that S = P−ǫQ1−ǫ ∈ B. Since S ∈ B, we have that C1 S C2. Further, we have that
P = ǫQ + (1 − ǫ)S . By consistency of fC1 ,C2 we get that C1 ≻P C2. However, this is a
contradiction.
Next, we show that if η · P < 0, then P ∈ D2. For the sake of contradiction, let us assume that
there is P such that η ·P < 0 but C1 P C2. Then there exists such ǫ that if |Q−P| < ǫ then η ·Q < 0
(and so Q < int(D1)). Thus there exists a ball B in D with P ∈ B, such that B ∩ int(D1) = ∅. Thus,
B ∩ D1 = ∅. We infer that some point S in B could be represented as a linear combination of P and
some point from D1. From consistency we would get that C1 ≻S C2, a contradiction.
Remark 2. We have shown that for each P ∈ D, (a) η · P > 0 implies that P ∈ D1 (and, so,
C1 ≻P C2), and (b) η · P < 0 implies that P ∈ D2 (and, so, C2 ≻P C1). From symmetry, the same
vector η works for each pair of committees C1 and C2 such that |C1 ∩ C2| = k − 1.
Now we will use continuity to prove that if η ·P = 0 then C1 =P C2. For the sake of contradiction
let us assume that this is not the case, i.e., that there exists a voting situation P ∈ D such that η ·P = 0
but C1 ,P C2. Without loss of generality, let us assume that C1 ≻P C2. Let Q be a voting situation
such that η · Q < 0 and so C2 ≻Q C1. For each x it holds that η · (xP + Q) < 0 and so C2 ≻xP+Q C1.
However, this contradicts continuity of fk. Thus, for every P ∈ D, if η · P = 0 then C1 =P C2.
17This is different from Young’s [60] and Merlin’s [41] approach, who operate on sets with disjoint interiors, but which
do not have to be disjoint on their own.
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From vector η, we retrieve a committee scoring function λ. For each committee position I ∈ [mk]
we set λ(I) = η[I]. Now, we can see that for each two committees C1,C2, and for each voting
situation P ∈ Qm! it holds that (see the comment below for an explanation of what Q is):
scoreλ(C1, P) − scoreλ(C2, P) =
∑
I∈[m]k
(
λ(I) · pos-weightI(C1, P) − λ(I) · pos-weightI(C2, P)
)
=
∑
I∈[m]k
λ(I) · αC1 ,C2(P)[I] =
∑
I∈[m]k
η[I] · αC1,C2 (P)[I] = η · Q,
where Q ∈ D is the representation of P in the space D (i.e., Q is the vector of values of the com-
mittee position-difference function αC1,C2 for profile P). From the above inequality we see that
scoreλ(C1, P) > scoreλ(C2, P) implies that C1 ≻P C2 and that scoreλ(C1, P) = scoreλ(C2, P) implies
that C1 =P C2. From neutrality we get that the same committee scoring function λ works for every
two committees C′1 and C
′
2 with |C
′
1 ∩ C
′
2| = k − 1
There is one more issue we need to deal with. So far, we gave no argument as to why λ should
satisfy the dominance property of committee scoring functions (i.e., that if I and J are two commit-
tee positions such that I dominates J, then λ(I) ≥ λ(J)). However, to get this property it suffices to
assume the committee dominance axiom for fk.
Summarizing our discussion from this section, we get our main result, Theorem A, for the
committees C1 and C2, with |C1 ∩C2| = k − 1. We continue our analysis in the next section.
5.4 Putting Everything Together: Comparing Arbitrary Committees
In this section we conclude the proof of Theorem A by extending the reasoning from the previous
section to apply to every two committees C1 and C2 irrespective of the size of their intersection.
Setting Up the Proof. Let fk be a k-winner election rule that is symmetric, consistent, continuous,
and has the committee dominance property. Let λ be the scoring function derived for this fk as
described at the end of the previous section. We know that for each two committees C1 and C2 such
that |C1 ∩ C2| = k − 1 and each voting situation P ∈ Qm! it holds that scoreλ(C1, P) > scoreλ(C2, P)
if and only if C1 ≻P C2, and scoreλ(C1, P) = scoreλ(C2, P) if and only if C1 =P C2. We will show
that the same holds for all committees C1 and C2, irrespective of the size of their intersection. We
will show this by induction over k − |C1 ∩C2|.
Let us fix some value k′ < k − 1 and let us assume that λ can be used to distinguish whether
some committee C1 is preferred over some committee C2 whenever |C1 ∩ C2| > k′. We will show
that the same λ can be used to distinguish whether committee C1 is preferred over committee C2
when |C1 ∩ C2| = k′.
Let C1 and C2 be two arbitrary committees such that |C1∩C2| = k′. Let us rename the candidates
so that C1 \C2 = {c1, . . . , ck−k′ }, C1 ∩ C2 = {ck−k′+1, . . . , ck} and C2 \ C1 = {ck+1, . . . , c2k−k′ }.
The Case Where k − k′ Is Even. If k − k′ is even, we consider the following two cases:
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Case 1: There exists a vector of 2k − k′ positions 〈p1, . . . , p2k−k′〉 such that:
λ({p1, . . . , pk}) + λ({pk−k′+1, . . . , p2k−k′ }) , 2λ({p k−k′
2 +1
, . . . , p k−k′
2 +k
}). (21)
Let us consider the committee C3 = {c k−k′
2 +1
, . . . , c k−k′
2 +k
}. We consider the vector space of
voting situations P ∈ Qm! such that C1 =P C3 and C3 =P C2 (the fact that this is a vector space
follows from the inductive assumption; |C1 ∩C3| = |C2 ∩C3| > k′). The conditions C1 =P C3
and C3 =P C2 are not contradictory (consider the profile in which each vote is cast exactly
once—in such profile all size-k committees are equivalent with respect to fk). This space has
dimension either m! − 2 or m! − 1. This is so, because each of the conditions C1 =P C3 and
C2 =P C3 boils down to a single linear equation. If these equations are independent then
the dimension is m! − 2. Otherwise, it is m! − 1. By transitivity of fk we get that in each
voting situation P from this space it holds that C1 =P C2 and that the committee score of C1
(according to λ) is equal to the committee score of C2. Let B be a base of this space. Further,
let v be a vote where each candidate ci, i ∈ {1, . . . , 2k − k′}, stands on position pi (recall
Equation (21) above), and let v′ be an identical vote except that candidates from C1 ∪ C2 are
listed in the reverse order (i.e., c1 is on position p2k−k′ , c2 is on position p2k−k′−1 and so on).
Let S b be a voting situation that consists of v and v′. The positions of C1 and C3 in v are:
posv(C1) = {p1, . . . , pk} and posv(C3) = {p k−k′2 +1, . . . , p k−k′2 +k}
The positions of C1 and C3 in v′ are:
posv′(C1) = {pk−k′+1, . . . , p2k−k′ } and posv′(C3) = {p k−k′2 +1, . . . , p k−k′2 +k}
Consequently, according to Equation (21), in voting situation S b the committee score of C1 is
not equal to that of C3. By the inductive assumption, it must be the case that C1 ,S b C3. This
means that the voting situations in B ∪ {S b} are linearly independent.
We now show that C1 =S b C2. Consider a permutation σ (over the candidate set) that swaps
c1 with c2k−k′ , c2 with c2k−k′−1, and so on. We note that σ(C1) = C2, σ(C2) = C1, and
S b = σ(S b). Thus, by symmetry of fk, it must be the case that C1 =S b C2. Further, the
committee scores of C1 and C2 are equal in S b.
Altogether, the base B ∪ {S b} defines an (m! − 1)-dimensional space of voting situations P
such that C1 =P C2 and the committee scores of C1 and C2 are equal. From Corollary 1 we
know that the set of voting situations P such that C1 =P C2 forms a vector space of dimension
m!−1. As a result, we get that for each voting situation P the condition C1 =P C2 is equivalent
to the condition that C1 has the same committee score as C2 according to λ.
The fact that C1 ≻S C2 whenever the committee score of C1 is greater than that of C2 follows
from Lemma 7.
Case 2: For each vector of 2k − k′ positions 〈p1, . . . , p2k−k′〉 it holds that (note that the condition
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below is a negation of the condition from Case 1):
λ({p1, . . . , pk})−λ({p k−k′
2 +1
, . . . , p k−k′
2 +k
}) =
λ({p k−k′
2 +1
, . . . , p k−k′
2 +k
}) − λ({pk−k′+1, . . . , p2k−k′ }).
As before, let C3 = {c k−k′
2 +1
, . . . , c k−k′
2 +k
}. Since the above equality must hold for each vector
of 2k−k′ positions, we see that if the committee score of C1 is equal to the committee score of
C3, then the committee score of C3 is equal to the committee score of C2. Consequently, by the
inductive assumption, we get that C1 =P C3 implies that C3 =P C2. Thus, by fk’s transitivity,
we get that for each voting situation P, the condition C1 =P C3 implies that C1 =P C2. As a
consequence of this reasoning, there exists an (m!− 1)-dimensional space of voting situations
P such that C1 =P C2 and such that C1 has the same committee score as C2. Similarly as in
Case 1, we conclude that for each voting situation P the condition C1 =P C2 is equivalent to
the condition that C1 has the same committee score as C2 according to λ, and that it holds that
C1 ≻P C2 whenever the committee score of C1 is greater than that of C2 (by Lemma 7).
The Case Where k − k′ ≥ 3 and k − k′ is Odd. Similarly as before we consider two cases:
Case 1: There exists a vector of 2k − k′ positions 〈p1, . . . , p2k−k′ 〉 and a number x ∈ {1, . . . k − k′}
such that:
λ({p1, . . . , pk}) + λ({pk−k′+1, . . . , p2k−k′ }) ,
λ({px, . . . , pk+x−1}) + λ({pk−k′+2−x, . . . , p2k−k′+1−x}).
In this case we can repeat the reasoning from Case 1 from the previous subsection (it suffices
to take C3 = {cx, . . . , ck+x−1}).
Case 2: For each vector of 2k − k′ positions 〈p1, . . . , p2k−k′ 〉 and each number x ∈ {1, . . . k − k′} it
holds that:
λ({p1, . . . , pk}) + λ({pk−k′+1, . . . , p2k−k′ }) =
λ({px, . . . , pk+x−1}) + λ({pk−k′+2−x, . . . , p2k−k′+1−x}).
The above inequality for x = ⌊ k−k′2 ⌋ and for x = ⌊
k−k′
2 ⌋ + 1 gives, respectively (note that
k − k′ − ⌊ k−k′2 ⌋ = ⌈
k−k′
2 ⌉):
λ({p1, . . . , pk}) + λ({pk−k′+1, . . . , p2k−k′ }) =
λ({p
⌊ k−k
′
2 ⌋
. . . , pk+⌊ k−k′2 ⌋−1}) + λ({p⌈ k−k′2 ⌉+2 . . . , pk+⌈ k−k′2 ⌉+1}),
and:
λ({p1, . . . , pk}) + λ({pk−k′+1, . . . , p2k−k′ }) =
λ({p
⌊ k−k
′
2 ⌋+1
. . . , pk+⌊ k−k′2 ⌋}) + λ({p⌈ k−k′2 ⌉+1 . . . , pk+⌈ k−k′2 ⌉}).
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Together, these two equalities give that:
λ({p
⌊ k−k
′
2 ⌋
. . . , pk+⌊ k−k′2 ⌋−1}) + λ({p⌈ k−k′2 ⌉+2 . . . , pk+⌈ k−k′2 ⌉+1}) =
λ({p
⌊ k−k
′
2 ⌋+1
. . . , pk+⌊ k−k′2 ⌋}) + λ({p⌈ k−k′2 ⌉+1 . . . , pk+⌈ k−k′2 ⌉}).
Since the above equality holds for each vector of 2k−k′ positions, after renaming the positions,
we get that for each set of k + 3 positions 〈q1, . . . , qk+3〉 it holds that:
λ({q1, . . . , qk}) + λ({q4, . . . , qk+3}) = λ({q2, . . . , qk+1}) + λ({q3, . . . , qk+2}).
After reformulation we get:
λ({q1, . . . , qk}) − λ({q2, . . . , qk+1}) = λ({q3, . . . , qk+2}) − λ({q4, . . . , qk+3}). (22)
If k is odd, we obtain the following series of equalities (the consecutive equalities, except
for the last one, are consequences of applying Equation (22) to the cyclic shifts of the list
〈q1, q2, . . . , qk+3〉; the last equality breaks the pattern and is a consequence of applying Equa-
tion (22) to the list 〈qk+2, qk+3, q1, q2, . . . , qk−1, qk+1, qk〉):
λ({q1, . . . , qk}) − λ({q2, . . . , qk+1}) = λ({q3, . . . , qk+2}) − λ({q4, . . . , qk+3})
= λ({q5, . . . , qk+3, q1}) − λ({q6, . . . , qk+3, q1, q2})
= λ({q7, . . . , qk+3, q1, q2, q3}) − λ({q8, . . . , qk+3, q1, q2, q3, q4})
...
= λ({qk+2, qk+3, q1, . . . , qk−2}) − λ({qk+3, . . . , q1, qk−1})
= λ({q1, . . . , qk−1, qk+1}) − λ({q2, . . . , qk+1}),
In consequence, it must be the case that λ({q1, . . . , qk}) = λ({q1, . . . , qk−1, qk+1}). Thus, by
transitivity, we get that λ is a constant function (in essence, what we have shown is that we
can replace positions in the set of k positions, one by one, without changing the value of the
committee scoring function). Let C3 = {c2, . . . , ck+1}. Since λ is a constant function, then by
the inductive assumption we have that for every voting situation P it holds that C1 =P C3 and
C3 =P C2. By transitivity we get that for each voting situation P it holds that C1 =P C2. Thus
our trivial scoring function works correctly on C1 and C2.
Let us now assume that k is even. Now we obtain the following series of equalities (in this
case all the consecutive equalities are consequences of applying Equation (22) to the cyclic
shifts of the sequence 〈q1, q2, . . . , qk+3〉):
λ({q1, . . . , qk}) − λ({q2, . . . , qk+1}) = λ({q3, . . . , qk+2}) − λ({q4, . . . , qk+3})
= λ({q5, . . . , qk+3, q1}) − λ({q6, . . . , qk+3, q1, q2})
= λ({q7, . . . , qk+3, q1, q2, q3}) − λ({q8, . . . , qk+3, q1, q2, q3, q4})
...
= λ({qk+3, q1, . . . , qk−1}) − λ({q1, . . . , qk})
= λ({q2, . . . , qk+1}) − λ({q3, . . . , qk+2}),
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In consequence, it is the case that:
λ({q1, . . . , qk}) − λ({q2, . . . , qk+1}) = λ({q2, . . . , qk+1}) − λ({q3, . . . , qk+2}),
and this holds for every sequence 〈q1, . . . , qk+2〉 of positions. Thus, we get that for each voting
situation in which {c1, . . . , ck} is equivalent to {c2, . . . , ck+1}, it also holds that {c2, . . . , ck+1} is
equivalent to {c3, . . . , ck+2}, it also holds that {c3, . . . , ck+2} is equivalent to {c4, . . . , ck+3}, etc.
Let C3 = {c2, . . . , ck+1}. From the preceding reasoning we have that for each voting situation
P the fact that it holds that C1 =P C3 implies that C1 =P C2. We conclude the proof in the
same way as in the case of even k − k′ (Case 2). Specifically, we conclude that there exists an
(m! − 1)-dimensional space of voting situations P such that C1 =P C2 and such that C1 has
the same committee score as C2. This means that for each voting situation P the condition
C1 =P C2 is equivalent to the condition that C1 has the same committee score as C2 according
to λ, and that it holds that C1 ≻P C2 whenever the committee score of C1 is greater than that
of C2 (by Lemma 7).
The End. We have shown that if a k-winner rule is symmetric, consistent, continuous, and has the
committee-dominance property, then it is a committee scoring rule. On the other hand, committee
scoring rules satisfy all these conditions. This completes our proof of Theorem A.
6 Conclusions
We have provided an axiomatic characterization of committee scoring rules, a new class of mul-
tiwinner voting rules recently introduced by Elkind et al. [17]. Committee scoring rules form a
remarkably general class of multiwinner systems that consists of many nontrivial rules with a va-
riety of applications. Thus, our characterization constitutes a fundamental framework for further
axiomatic studies of this fascinating class and makes an important step towards their understand-
ing. We mention that various properties of committee scoring rules, and the internal structure of
the class, were already studied by Elkind et al. [17] and Faliszewski et al. [20, 19]. However, they
mostly focused on specific rules and on subclasses of the whole class, while this work distinguishes
the class of committee scoring rules among the universe of multiwinner voting rules.
Our Theorem A required developing a set of useful tools and new concepts, such as decision
rules. We believe that they are an interesting notion that deserves further study.
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